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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three separate essays on Peer-to-Peer (P2P) online
credit markets. The first essay presents new empirical evidence of a decrease in loan
demand and repayment when prices in the market are determined by competing
lenders in an auction as compared to the case in which a platform directly controls
all prices. The paper develops an econometric model of loan demand and repayment
which is then used to predict borrower choices when they are offered prices set by
lenders in a market. I find that when lenders set prices, borrowers are more likely to
pick loans of shorter maturity and smaller sizes, and repay less. Aggregated at the
market level, demand and repayment of credit fall by 10% and 2% respectively.
In the second paper, I quantify the effects of implementation of finer credit-
scoring on credit demand, defaults and repayment in the context of a large P2P
online credit platform. I exploit an exogenous change in the platform’s credit scoring
policy where the centralized price setting rules ensure that the one-to-one relationship
between credit scores and prices remains intact unlike in a traditional credit market
vi
where it is broken. The results show that a 1% increase in interest rate due to the
implementation of finer credit scoring results in an average decrease of 0.29% in the
requested loan amount, an average increase of 0.01 in the fraction of borrowers who
default and an average increase of 0.02 in the fraction of loan repaid. These findings
contribute to a better understanding of how a reduction in information asymmetry
affects borrower choices in a credit market.
The third paper explores the main drivers behind the geographic expansion in
demand for credit from P2P online platforms. It uses data from the two largest
platforms in the United States to conduct an empirical analysis. By exploiting
heterogeneity in local credit markets before the entry of P2P online platforms, the
paper estimates the effect of local credit market conditions on demand for credit
from P2P platforms. The paper uses a spatial autoregressive model for the main
specification. We find that P2P consumer credit expanded more in counties with
poor branch networks, lower concentration of banks, and lower leverage ratios.
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1Chapter 1
Can Peer-to-Peer Online Platforms Improve Market
Outcomes by Controlling Prices?
1.1 Introduction
An important function of a market is to allocate resources efficiently by allowing mar-
ket participants to trade with each other and determine prices of resources in the
process. However, this process is often hindered by many different types of frictions
and their associated costs which can restrict a market from functioning properly.
Recently, several Peer-to-Peer (P2P) online platforms have emerged fundamentally
changing how economic agents trade goods and services. The emergence of platforms
like Airbnb, Amazon, Ebay, Lending Club, Prosper and Uber have shown how tech-
nological advances can help to improve competition, resource allocation and asset
utilization by facilitating trade in efficiently designed markets. They provide services
like finding the best trader given your needs, providing information about goods and
other traders’ trustworthiness and trading history, aggregating small and thin local
markets into bigger and thicker markets, and facilitating transfer of goods and pay-
ments. In doing so, these platforms reduce many frictions and their associated costs
found in offline counterparts of such markets.
These platforms often also set the rules of trade which may prevent market fail-
ure. One such rule that some platforms use is that they directly control the prices
within the markets they create.1 This restricts a fundamental function of a com-
1For example, Lending Club, Prosper and Uber directly set prices, whereas Airbnb and Amazon
allow sellers to set their own prices. Ebay gives its sellers even more freedom by allowing them to
pick their own pricing mechanism which is either an auction or a posted pricing mechanism.
2petitive market: its ability to aggregate information which is then reflected in the
prices. If prices are not allowed to adjust freely in a market, it can hinder the pro-
cess of information revelation through price discovery and thus lead to information
asymmetry between buyers and sellers. As a consequence of asymmetric information
the market may suffer from adverse selection which ultimately prevents the compet-
itive equilibrium in the market from achieving first best allocation Akerlof (1970).
This raises the question of whether controlling market prices will result in better or
worse outcomes for consumers if a platform uses this market design choice to prevent
market failure.
In this paper I use micro data from a large online P2P credit market to show
evidence of better market outcomes when prices are set by the platform instead
of by competing lenders in an auction. To investigate the channels through which
a pricing mechanism can affect outcomes in this credit market, I first study how
changes in contract terms, including prices (interest rates), affect borrower demand
and repayment of credit. Since these decisions of borrowers are interdependent the
effects of changes in contract terms can be nonlinear. Taking this into account, I
specify an econometric model of loan demand and repayment with specific emphasis
on the role of interdependencies in borrower choices and estimate it using granular
data from Prosper.com, which is the second largest P2P online credit platform in
the United States by loan volume.
I use the estimated parameters to conduct a counterfactual experiment in which
borrowers are offered prices determined in an auction among lenders. To find the
set of counterfactual prices I exploit a change in the pricing mechanism implemented
by the platform and use machine learning to match borrowers under the two pricing
mechanisms based on a rich set of borrower characteristics and market conditions.
3Given the inefficiency of simple matching procedures in high dimensions, I turn the
problem into a prediction problem: I first use several machine learning techniques to
predict the contracted price for each borrower under the auction pricing mechanism
using borrower and market characteristics. Here I use sample splitting to select the
technique that gives the lowest psuedo out-of-sample prediction error2. Next, I use
this estimated pricing function to predict the counterfactual prices for borrowers
who were issued loans under the platform’s posted-price mechanism and plug them
back into the estimated loan demand and repayment model. This gives me borrower
choices under this counterfactual scenario and then I aggregate them up to determine
the new market outcomes.
I find that when lenders set prices using an auction, borrowers are more likely to
switch to shorter maturity loan contracts, smaller loan sizes and lower repayment.
Aggregated at the market level, demand for credit and repayment of credit owed
fall by 10% and 2% respectively. This has important implications for an online
platform’s ability to improve the allocation of credit by controlling market prices.
I discuss these findings stem from the platform’s ability to screen borrowers using
proprietary credit scoring technology which reduces the average costs of screening
since the platform can do it at scale. Here I highlight the differences in the two
price distributions. I show that the platform charged, on average, lower prices to
borrowers than the market. Furthermore, the difference between the platform price
and the market price is increasing in borrower riskiness. The platform charges a
lower risk premium to the risky borrower than the market would. This key insight
explains many of the distributional effects I find in this paper.
Given the nature of individual level data from a market in which prices are indi-
2In section 5 I explain that this approach has several advantages over its alternatives in calcu-
lating the counterfactual input prices I need to answer the question motivated above.
4vidual specific, I was able to conduct the counterfactual experiment at the individual
level. This allowed me to analyze the distributional effects of the in addition to the
average effects discussed above. The distribution of the effects of change in pricing
mechanism on borrowers’ maturity choices show that the effects are positive and
increasing in credit scores. This means that borrowers with higher credit scores are
more likely to pick a loan of longer maturity than borrowers with low risk. The
distribution of the effects on loan amount tell a very interesting story. Over here we
have two effects: partial and full effects and both their distributions show positive
effects in different ways. The distribution of partial effects on loan amount show that
the effects are positive and decreasing in credit score. However, the distribution of
full effects on loan amount show that that borrowers with the lowest or the highest
credit scores are affected less than the borrowers who have credit scores near the
median score. Lastly, the distributions of the partial and full effects on repayment
show that the effects are positive and decreasing in credit scores. This means that
the increases in repayment from high risk borrowers are bigger than increases in re-
payment from low risk ones. It also explains the decrease in aggregate defaults which
is quite an accomplishment for a credit market.
This paper contributes to two main strands of literature. The first is the growing
literature on multi-sided platforms, including the peer-to-peer platforms that make
up the sharing economy. Questions about the effects of different platform design
choices on market outcomes are of particular interest. Recent studies include the
works of Cullen and Farronato (2015) who focus on matching short-term supply and
demand on a platform for domestic tasks, Fradkin (2014) estimates search inefficien-
cies in a market for short term accommodation rentals, and study seller behavior
under different pricing mechanisms in a general marketplace. On a more related
5note to my paper, the theoretical work by Hagiu and Wright (2015a) and Hagiu
and Wright (2015b) attempt to study the trade-offs faced by such platforms in their
choice of operating as marketplaces or resellers.
Among the specific papers on online P2P credit platforms, there has been no
attempt to estimate the structural parameters that capture the sensitivity of credit
demand and repayment to different contract terms. Estimating such parameters be-
comes important when one has to estimate the effect of a different pricing mechanism
on the aggregate market outcomes. Nonetheless, several reduced form papers on P2P
online credit markets provide motivation for this approach. Pope and Sydnor (2011)
and Ravina (2013) show how an applicant’s personal characteristics (for example
outward appearance and skin color) can affect her probability of getting a loan, Iyer
et al. (2016) provide evidence that the market is able to determine interest rates that
predict defaults better than the finest credit scores do, and Zhang and Liu (2012)
provide evidence of investor herding behavior in these markets.
Two closely related papers Meyer (2013) and Wei and Lin (2016) show reduced
form evidence of how a change in the pricing mechanism on P2P online credit plat-
form affects lender returns, prices and probability of getting a loan. The contribution
of my paper, on the other hand, is to estimate the effects of such a change in pricing
mechanism on the demand and repayment behavior of borrowers. Moreover, I use
a structural model to explain the channels through which the prices affect borrower
choices. To that end I show how interdependencies in borrower choices reveal that
full effects can be quite different from partial effects.
The second field this paper contributes to is the empirical literature on consumer
and microcredit markets. A classic contribution here is by Karlan and Zinman (2005)
who carry out an experiment in a credit market to identify sources of adverse selec-
6tion. On the other hand, Einav et al. (2012) and Crawford and Schivardi (2016) use
structural approaches to estimate the effects of contract terms on loan demand and
repayment in consumer and firm credit markets. My paper builds on the framework
proposed by Einav et al. (2012) by introducing loan maturity as an additional choice
variable in the specification of loan demand. There are two main reasons to include
this choice as part of the model. First, in many credit markets, and particularly in
P2P online credit markets, choosing the maturity of a loan is part of the loan demand
process, and Hertzberg et. al (2016) show how this choice can be a significant source
of adverse selection in online P2P credit markets. They use a natural experiment
that took place on Lendingclub.com to identify the effect of loan maturity on default
to show that an increase in loan maturity has a negative effect on loan repayment
and the magnitude of this effect is much bigger than that of an increase in interest
rate. Second, since loan maturity affects both the choice of loan amount and the
choice of repayment, a change in loan price has indirect effects on loan amount and
repayment because that same change in price also affects loan maturity choice. Thus,
the full effect of a change in price on loan size and repayment needs to take this into
account and by ignoring it one could bias the price coefficients in the model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 provides an institu-
tional overview of P2P online credit markets with an emphasis on how they differ
from traditional credit markets, section 1.3 presents the data and sample selection
procedure, section 1.4 section 4 develops the econometric model and its estimation
procedure, and presents estimation results, section 1.5 presents the case counterfac-
tual experiment and its results, and section 1.6 gives conclusion.
71.2 Institutional Overview
Credit is considered an essential commodity for improving social welfare by allowing
consumers to smooth consumption over time and by allowing firms to invest in new
projects. Access to credit is often considered one of the hallmarks of a developed
economy. However, a traditional credit market today is still plagued by many fric-
tions, some of which have been shown to be reduced greatly within an online P2P
credit market.
Over the past decade more than a thousand P2P online credit platforms have
opened up across the world.3 In the three biggest markets, China, United States and
United Kingdom, cumulative loan volumes by Dec. 2015 reached $70 billion, $25
billion, and $7 billion, respectively.4 In 2014 in U.S. alone, the five biggest platforms
issued $3.5 billion in loans compared to $1.2 billion in 2013. However, this makes
up a sliver of consumer debt in U.S. To put things in perspective, total outstanding
credit card debt in the United States grew to $880 billion by July 2014. According
to a Fitch report, the market volume in P2P online credit markets may grow to
$114 billion in the medium term.5 The U.S. market is dominated by two competing
platforms named Lending Club and Prosper which together have a market share of
over 90% in P2P small personal loans.
In a typical online P2P credit market borrowers seek loans from a group of lenders
by posting their credit information on the platform website. The platform performs
initial screening of borrowers, collects credit information, and sets loan contract
terms including loan maturity, interest rate, and transaction fees. Individual and
institutional investors decide how much to invest in each loan based on their own
3Americas Alternative Finance Benchmarking Report, 2015
4Citi Group Report, 2016
5Federal government data aggregated by www.nerdwallet.com
8preferences. In this market, in its current form, the price vector is controlled by
the platform while both borrowers and lenders are price takers and pick their own
allocations.
The processes of obtaining and investing in a loan through a P2P online platform
are similar across major platforms. In what follows, I will explain these processes
in detail for Prosper.com which provided the data used in this paper and it is the
second largest P2P online credit platform in the U.S. by loan volume. The main
flows of information and funds are depicted in Figure 1.1.
To obtain a loan, a borrower first needs to be accepted by the platform to be
able to post a listing for the loan. The platform accepts or rejects a borrower based
on a credit check to make sure the borrower meets some basic cut off criterion6. If
the borrower is accepted, the platform assigns him a credit grade which is a function
of an external credit score and the platform’s own proprietary credit score. Based
on this credit grade, the borrower is offered a menu of loan contracts which differ
in maturity, interest rate and loan origination fee. Each borrower is also assigned
a loan limit based on his credit grade and this loan limit stays the same regardless
of which loan contract the borrower picks. Once the borrower picks a loan contract
and loan amount, L, a standardized listing for that loan is created on the platform’s
website which includes detailed information about the loan contract and borrower
credit report.
To obtain a loan, a borrower first needs to be accepted by the platform to be
able to post a listing for the loan. The platform accepts or rejects a borrower based
on a credit check to make sure the borrower meets some basic cut off criterion7. If
6On Prosper.com a borrower needs to have a minimum Experian Scorex Plus score of 640 to be
eligible to get a loan.
7On Prosper.com a borrower needs to have a minimum Experian Scorex Plus score of 640 to be
eligible to get a loan.
9the borrower is accepted, the platform assigns him a credit grade which is a function
of an external credit score and the platform’s own proprietary credit score. Based
on this credit grade, the borrower is offered a menu of loan contracts which differ
in maturity, interest rate and loan origination fee. Each borrower is also assigned
a loan limit based on his credit grade and this loan limit stays the same regardless
of which loan contract the borrower picks. Once the borrower picks a loan contract
and loan amount, L, a standardized listing for that loan is created on the platform’s
website which includes detailed information about the loan contract and borrower
credit report.
The listing stays open for one to two weeks during which time different lenders
invest in the loan with a minimum investment of $25 per loan per lender, i.e. lj ≥ $25.
If the requested loan amount is reached,
∑J
j=1 lj = L, the listing is closed from further
investment and the loan is issued to the borrower. In case the listing period is over
but the desired amount is not reached, the listing is termed unsuccessful and the
lenders get their investments back.8
To repay the loan, the borrower makes monthly payments with an interest rate r1
and if he defaults (i.e. if the he chooses s < 1), the platform sells the loan to a debt
collection agency and distributes the proceeds among the lenders of that specific loan
in the ratio of their investments. A lender j earns a gross return of (1 + r2) slj as the
borrower repays the loan. The platform charges a loan origination fee, f1, to each
borrower which can range from 1% - 5% of loan amount. The platform also charges
a 1% loan servicing fee, f2, to lenders which is earned by platform as the loan is
repaid.9
8The platform also allows the borrowers an option to convert the listing to a loan if it receives
at least 70% of the requested amount.
9Note that r1 > r2 because f1, f2 > 0. Also note that there is no charge to a borrower for
posting the initial listing
10
A few important points to note here are that these are small personal loans, the
borrower does not need to provide any collateral to take the loan, and lastly the
platform does not perform any monitoring of the borrower.10 However, this does
not mean that there is no penalty for the borrower if he defaults. A debt collection
agency can take the borrower to court which would cost the borrower fees, time, and
effort and eventually the remaining amount owed. Moreover, the borrower would
also be penalized with a higher interest rate if he wishes to take a loan in the future
because the repayment behavior of a borrower directly affects his credit score which
can be accessed by any professional lender.
There are some unique features of a P2P online credit market which reduce certain
frictions present in a traditional offline credit market. These are explained as follows:
Lower search costs for borrower: A borrower can apply to take a loan from many
different lenders at the same time with a single application and save time and effort
of contacting several lenders to find the best contract terms.
Lower search and operational costs for lenders: A lender does not have to engage
in costly marketing activities to promote his loan contracts to the public and wait for
borrowers to show in a branch office or a website, both of which require additional
start-up and operating costs.
Lower cost diversification for lenders: A lender does not have to invest in an entire
loan but instead can invest a small amount in a loan and be part of a syndicate for
that one loan without incurring the high costs of creating a syndicate. Traditionally,
the syndicated loan market was restricted for large corporate loans due to the costs
associated with forming a syndicate of multiple lenders. However, in a P2P online
credit market, such costs are incurred by the platform which is able to keep costs
10The borrower usually states the purpose of the loan in the loan listing, and the most common
purpose is to repay previous credit card debt.
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low due to innovations in technology and by utilizing economies of scale.
Access to a significantly bigger credit market: With the advent of a P2P online
credit platforms, small lenders are able to lend to borrowers in geographical locations
where these small lenders do not have a physical presence. Given the extremely low
cost of transferring funds, the platform is able to create thickness in the market by
aggregating thin and local credit markets into one big market for credit. Theoreti-
cally, this should give a small local lender access to the entire borrower population
of a country which effectively reduces the need for the lender to have a physical
presence near its borrowers. This has severe implications for increasing competition
in the credit markets.
There are also differences in regulations for a P2P credit platform which allow it
to scale up its operations. Since the platform is simply an intermediary that matches
borrowers with savers in the credit market, it is not subject to the same set of regula-
tions as a depository institution (e.g. a commercial bank) or an investment company
(e.g. a mutual fund). There are two primary reasons for this: First, a crucial point of
difference between a P2P credit platform and a traditional bank is that the platform
does not solve the problem of liquidity mismatch between savers and borrowers in
the same way that a depository institution does. Matching different borrowers and
savers/investors based on different maturity preferences is a fundamental function
of depository institutions. This also makes them susceptible to bank runs if there
is a shock to the liquidity needs of savers (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) or worse a
contagion of bank runs (Allen and Gale, 2000). On the other hand, a P2P credit
platform the platform acts purely as a match-maker and does not take any risk on
behalf of investors. The investment of savers is not a liability of the platform but
of the borrowers only. Hence, in case of a positive shock to investors’ demand for
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early withdrawal of investment, the investors can simply sell their claim on their
loans in a secondary market. This way a bank run can be avoided and this is the
reason that P2P credit platforms are not subject to any reserve requirements by the
central bank. Second, unlike a depository institution or an investment company, the
platform does not make investment decisions on behalf of the lenders. The platform
simply provides the information to lenders and facilitates the transfer of funds. As
a consequence of this, the platform is much less restricted in forming its ownership
structure as it is free from any fiduciary requirements. These two key differences
lower the regulatory and legal costs of starting and operating a firm and help to
scale up its operations.
Lenders are Price takers: One big disadvantage to lenders is that they lose their
bargaining power to set their own prices which would effectively mean they would
be price takers if they want to participate in this market. The equilibrium prices
in this market are not determined by lenders competing with each other in this
unified and more competitive credit market but instead the prices are set directly
by the platform. This last point raises the question of whether the platform is able
to allocate credit as efficiently as one would see if the prices were determined by
borrowers and lenders in the market using any bargaining or auction process. On
the one hand the platform lowers several different frictions and their associated costs
which result in more competition relative to a traditional offline credit market, while
on the other hand the platform may theoretically reduce one of the biggest benefit
of increasing competition – that of resultant set of prices which increase consumer
surplus.
A pioneering feature of online P2P credit platforms, like Prosper and Lending
Club, is that they specialize in screening borrowers at scale and then set prices ac-
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cordingly. The idea is that the platform uses its proprietary credit scoring method-
ology, developed using advances in machine learning, to predict the probability of
default. Based on that, the platform assigns a high price to a borrower if his prob-
ability of default is high. This is not to say that the platform assigns the right
price because the ordering of prices set in the market already reflects probabilities
of default. Instead the platform maintains the same ordering with a lower set of
prices. This way of screening is already a lower cost method of screening, but since
the platform is able to do this at scale, the average cost of screening is decreased.
Given the digital nature of such a market where the details of each transaction
are recorded by a computer, it provides excellent opportunities for researchers to
study consumer financial decision making. The data generated by these markets
contain records of several decisions made by a consumer, the details of his choice set,
and the market conditions when such decisions are made. Additionally, researchers
can study how individual consumer decisions aggregate up to the market level to
determine aggregate market outcomes.
1.3 Data and Sample Selection
The data for this paper come from Prosper.com which is the second largest P2P
online credit platform in the U.S. by loan volume. These data contain all required
loan specific and borrower specific variables. For each loan, I observe the amount of
loan, maturity period, interest rate, amount repaid (till the end of sample) and time
stamps for loan application, issuance and repayment. For each borrower I observe a
rich set of credit variables from the Experian credit bureau, Prosper.com’s own credit
score, credit grade and demographic variables. Identifiers for each loan application,
loan and borrower allows for seamless merging of different parts of the database.
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Owing to the online nature of the platform, it can implement big changes to the
workings of the market very quickly and at scale. To address this issue, I used 54
snapshots of Prosper.com from internet archives to look for changes in borrowing
and lending processes over time. These proved to be quite useful in isolating a time
period during which no such major changes took place.
For my main estimation sample, I selected all loans issued between May 1st,
2013 to June 30th, 2014 and their repayment data was observed until Feb 29th,
2016. I dropped loans by borrowers of the lowest credit grade since they were offered
just one maturity contract. Moreover, I keep only new loans because modeling the
evolution of borrower behavior for follow-up loans is outside the scope of this paper.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.1.
Next I highlight the variation in the platform’s pricing schedule that was used to
identify the main price coefficients in the model to come. Figure 1.2 illustrates two
examples of how the platform changes prices for identical borrowers over time. The
dotted line (. . .) shows all borrowers which are observationally identical in terms of
their risk measure, the expected loss rate, which is the finest measure of borrower
riskiness that the platform uses. The solid line ( ) gives another example for another
set of identical borrowers but these borrowers which are less risky than the ones
represented by the dotted line. The flat part of each line is evidence of the fact that
at any given snapshot of time, all borrowers with the same estimated loss rate are
considered identical and are assigned the same price. The variation over time in
interest rates conditional on this risk measure is what I use in the model in section
4 to identify my coefficients of interest.
This expected loss rate assigned to a borrower can be interpreted as the expected
loss on $1 of investment to that borrower or simply the default probability. Notice
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that this is independent of loan amount and loan maturity. This measure is sim-
ply a function of the borrower’s credit and demographic variables. The platform
sets prices based on loan term, whether a borrower has taken a prior loan from its
the same platform, a measure of borrower riskiness (expected loss rate) and market
and macroeconomic factors. Here the identifying assumption is that an individual
borrower’s loan demand and repayment choices do not depend on those market and
macroeconomic factors. Once a borrower is accepted by the platform, he expects to
get a loan almost surely (i.e. with probability 0.99), his decision depends only on
contract specific variables (price, term, and fees) and his own observed and unob-
served demographic and credit characteristics. Hence, when the platform changes
prices for identical borrowers over time, as shown in Figure 1.2 for two representative
types of borrowers who vary in their expected loss rates, this variation is exogenous
to a borrower’s decision of loan contract, size and repayment.
1.4 An Econometric Model of Loan Demand and Repayment
I specify a model of loan demand and repayment with the objective of quantifying
the effects of contract terms on borrower choices while taking into account the in-
terdependencies in those choices. I assume each borrower has a liquidity need and is
willing to borrow from a set of lenders on the platform which has been allowed by
the platform. Each borrower is assigned a credit grade based on which he is offered a
maximum loan amount and a set of two loan maturity contracts from which he can
pick only one. The contracts differ in maturity, interest rate and loan origination fee
but the loan limit is the same on both contracts. Each borrower then decides which
maturity contract to pick, how much loan to take, constrained by the loan limit, and
subsequently how much of the borrowed amount to repay in order to maximize his
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expected utility from these choices. 11
The model adapts the framework of Einav et al. (2012) and Crawford and Schivardi
(2016) but differs in the specification of loan demand by adding choice of maturity
contract. Loan maturity is an integral part of a loan contract and borrowers often
face this choice when taking a personal loan. This choice that borrowers face becomes
important when other loan contract terms change with the loan maturity, which is
the case on P2P lending platforms.
Let there be i = 1, . . . , I borrowers each of whom picks exactly one loan contract
from a set of two contracts indexed by j = 3 or 5. The specification of indirect utility
for borrower i who picks a j − year loan contract is given by
U∗ij = αPjPriceij + αFjFeeij +X
′
iαXj + εUij
Here Priceij and Feeij denote the price (interest rate) and loan origination fee offered
to borrower i on contract j which are the only two variables that vary across the
maturity contracts. Xi is a vector of borrower specific variables, including credit
scores and demographic variables, and εUij is the error term observed by borrower
but not by researcher.
Each borrower has a true loan demand representing a liquidity need which he aims
to fulfill by taking a loan from the platform. The specification of this unobserved
true loan demand need is given by
L∗i = βTTermi + βPPricei + βFFeei +X
′
iβX + εLi
11Since more than 90% (get the exact number) of the loan listings get funded, it is safe to assume
a walrasian supply of credit coming from a large number of suppliers in a single market.
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Where Termi, Pricei and Feei represent the contract-specific variables of the loan
contract the borrower ends up picking, and εLi is the error term observed by borrower
by not by researcher. Note here that the variable Termi is essentially the same as
the binary variable indicating the choice of maturity contract.
Finally, conditional on having a loan of contract variables Termi, Pricei, and
Feei each borrower has a demand to repay a fraction S
∗
i of loan principal. The
specification of this unobserved demand to repay is given by
S∗i = γTTermi + γPPricei + γFFeei + γLLi + γH1{Li = Li}+X ′iγX + εSi
Where Li is the observed loan size, Li is the loan limit assigned to borrower i by
the platform, and εSi is the error term observed by borrower by not by researcher.
1.4.1 Estimation
In this section I explain the estimation strategy which boils down to a full Maximum
Likelihood Estimation.
First I assume (εU , εL, εS) are distributed jointly normal with the distribution
given by f (εU , εL, εS) =
To derive the choice probabilities and the likelihood function, I first rewrite the
joint density as the product of two conditional densities and one unconditional den-
sity:
f (εU , εL, εS) = f (εS | εL, εU) f (εL | εU) f (εU)
To simplify the notation I define the following matrices ofWUi = [∆Pricei,∆Feei, Xi],
18
WLi = [Termi, P ricei, Feei, Xi], WSi =
[
Termi, P ricei, Feei, Li,1{Li = Li}, Xi
]
and the following sets of parameters α = {αP , αF , αX}, β = {βT , βP , βF , βX} and
γ = {γT , γP , γF , γL, γH , γX}. Now I can derive the individual choice probabilities.
First I consider the choice of loan contract. Define Qi as
Qi =

1, if U∗i5 − U∗i3 ≥ 0
0, otherwise
The probability that the borrower picks the 5-year loan contract is given by
PQi=1 = Φ (W
′
Uiα)
and the probability that a borrower picks the 3-year contract is PQi=0 = 1−PQi=1.
Here εUi = εU3i−εU5i, αX = αX5−αX3, and for simplification I assume the coefficients
on the alternative specific variables to be the same for each alternative i.e. αP5 =
αP3 = αP and αF5 = αF3 = αF . Note here that for alternative invariant covariates,
only the difference in the coefficients αX will be identified.
Next I consider the loan size choice. For this, the observable counterpart for L∗i
is Li defined as follows
Li =

L∗i = W
′
Liβ + εLi, if L
∗
i < Li
Li, otherwise
If L∗i < Li, the true loan demand of the borrower, L
∗
i , is observed since the
borrower’s loan limit constrained was not binding. The probability of observing such
a case is given by
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PLi=L∗i |εUi = Prob (L
∗
i = W
′
Liβ + εLi)
= fεL|εU
(
Li −W ′Liβ
)
On the other hand, if the loan limit constraint is binding for borrower i, i.e.
L∗i ≥ Li, then the true loan demand of the borrower is not observed and thus the
probability of observing a loan equal to the limit is given by
PLi=Li|εUi = Prob (L
∗
i ≥ W ′Liβ + εLi)
= FεL|εU
(
W ′Liβ − Li
)
Calculation of the moments of the conditional distribution function FεL|εU is com-
plicated because ρUL 6= 0 and εUi is not observed for any borrower. For this reason, I
cannot directly calculate the moments of the conditional distribution function FεL|εU
and instead must integrate over all εUi that result in the observed loan size. This
yields the following expression for likelihood of loan size choice conditional on choos-
ing a loan maturity contract
PLi|Qi=1 =
W ′Uiα∫
−∞
PLi|εUi × f (εU) dεU
and
PLi|Qi=0 =
∞∫
W ′Uiα
PLi|εUi × f (εU) dεU
Next, conditional on the loan size and loan contract choices, I derive the probabil-
ity of observing loan repayment outcome censored by full payments or end of sample.
For this I first define a censoring point S¯i ∈ (0, 1] as the fraction of loan that needs
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to be repaid by the end of my sample12. There are two possibilities for repayment:
(i) default before full repayment or censoring point, (ii) repayment censored due
to full repayment or the end of sample. The observed loan repayment choice is then
given by
Si =

S∗i = W
′
Siγ + εSi, if S
∗
i < S¯i
S¯i, if S
∗
i ≥ S¯i
The probability of observing repayment less than censoring point (analogous to de-
fault) is given by
PSi=S∗i |εLi ,εUi = fεS |εL,εU
(
Si −W ′Siγ
)
The probability of observing full or censored repayment is given by
PSi=S¯i|εLi ,εUi = FεS |εL,εU
(
W ′Siγ − S¯i
)
Here again, calculation of the moments of the conditional distribution function
FεS |εL,εU is complicated since εUi is not observed. Another problem here is that εLi
is not observed for any borrower who picked a loan size exactly equal to the limit
i.e. Li = L
∗
i . For these borrowers, I cannot directly calculate the moments of the
conditional distrbution function FεS |εL,εU and instead must integrate over all εLi that
result in the observed loan size equal to the limit. There are two cases here: For
borrowers who choose loan sizes less than their loan limits, I integrate over all possible
εUi and for borrowers who choose loan sizes equal to their loan limits I integrate over
all possible εUi and all possible εLi. The expressions for the likelihood of observed
12Note that S¯i = 1 for completed loans.
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repayment conditional on borrowers choosing loans of sizes less than loan limits are
given by:
PSi|Li=L∗i ,Qi=1 =
W ′Uiα∫
−∞
PSi|εLi,εUi × f (εL, εU) dεU
PSi|Li=L∗i ,Qi=0 =
∞∫
W ′Uiα
PSi|εLi,εUi × f (εL, εU) dεU
The expressions for the likelihood of observed repayment conditional on borrowers
choosing loans of sizes equal to loan limits are given by:
PSi|Li=Li,Qi=1 =
∞∫
L¯i−W ′Liβ
W ′Uiα∫
−∞
PSi|εLi,εUi × f (εL, εU) dεUdεL
PSi|Li=Li,Qi=0 =
∞∫
L¯i−W ′Liβ
∞∫
W ′Uiα
PSi|εLi,εUi × f (εL, εU) dεUdεL
To summarize, I observce eight possible mutually exclusive cases observed in the
data and I use Maximum Likelihood Estimation to estimate the parameters α, β, γ,
and Σ.
Error Structure Discussion
The correlation parameters ρUS, and ρLS have economic meaning. They charac-
terize the relation between a borrower’s unobserved reasons for picking a loan with a
longer maturity and loan size, and his repayment behavior. If both these correlation
parameters are zero, it means there is no new information in the choice of loan con-
tract and choice of loan size about later repayment. However, if ρUS > 0, one should
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expect that, all else equal, borrowers who pick loans of longer maturity are likely
to repay more and thus are better risks to take. Similarly, if ρLS > 0, one should
expect that, all else equal, borrowers who pick loans of larger amounts are expected
are likely to repay more.
The correlation parameter ρUS helps with identification – if it is zero, loan size
can be considered independent of loan contract choice. Furthermore, the variance
parameters, σU , σL, σS capture the importance of unobserved characteristics relative
observed characteristics in borrower decisions.
1.4.2 Identification Assumptions
I now highlight and discuss the sources of variation in the data that identify specific
parameters of interest in the demand and repayment model. The parameters of
interest from the demand model are the price coefficients in all three equations,
αP , βP , γP , loan maturity coefficients in equations 2 and 3, βT and γT , and the loan
size coefficient in equation 3, γL.
For the price coefficients, I use variation in the platform’s pricing schedule con-
ditional on platform’s finest measure of borrower riskiness, the expected loss rate,
which can be interpreted as the expected loss on $1 of investment to the borrower or
simply the default probability. The platform sets prices based on loan term, whether
a borrower has taken a prior loan from the same platform, expected loss rate and
market and macroeconomic factors. The key identifying assumption here is that an
individual borrower’s loan demand and repayment choices do not depend on market
and macroeconomic factors. Once a borrower is accepted by the platform, she ex-
pects to get a loan almost surely13, her decision depends only on contract specific
13This is because over 90% of non-cancelled loan applications get funded.
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variables (price, term, and fees) and her own observed and unobserved demographic
and credit characteristics. Hence, when the platform changes prices for identical
borrowers over time, as shown in Figure 1.2 for two representative types of borrow-
ers who vary in their expected loss rates, this variation is exogenous to a borrower’s
decision of loan contract, size and repayment.
For βT and γT , note that in equation 1, the choice of loan contract depends on the
difference in the contract specific variables, not the actual levels of those variables. It
becomes clear then that conditional on making the contract choice, the loan size and
loan repayment decisions depend on the levels of the chosen contract. Furthermore,
I allow the unobservables εS and εL to be correlated with εU .
For γL, I highlight that loan limits are artificially imposed by the platform. This
induced variation in the loan limits creates variation in loan amounts which helps to
identify the coefficient of loan amount in equation 3. By allowing the unobservable
in εS to be correlated with εL, the identification of a change in repayment to loan
size comes from variation in loan limits.
1.4.3 Demand Estimates
Table 1.2 provides the estimates of the demand model. The first column in the table
provides the marginal effects of variables on the probability of picking the 5-year
maturity contract over the 3-year maturity contract. This probability is sensitive
to the difference in the interest rates on the two contracts. A one percentage point
increase in the difference in interest rates reduces the probability of picking the longer
term contract by 5.1 percentage points. Also note that borrowers with high credit
scores are more likely to pick the longer term contract.
The second and third columns in Table 1.2 give estimates of the average effects
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of variables on loan size choice and loan repayment choice. Loan size is much less
sensitive to changes in interest rate than to loan origination fees and loan maturity
term. A one percent increase in interest rate decreases loan size by $82. In contrast,
a 1 percent increase in loan origination fees decreases loan size by about $2,300.
Switching from a 3-year to a 5-year maturity contract increases loan size by about
$2,700.
Loan repayment is more sensitive to a change in interest rate and loan maturity
than to loan origination fee. A 1 percent increase in interest rate decreases the
fraction of loan repaid by 1 percentage point and switching from a 3-year to a 5-year
maturity contract decreases the fraction of loan repaid by 3.5 percentage points.
Lastly, a $1000 increase in loan size decreases the fraction of loan repaid by 0.04
percentage point. A change in loan origination fee has no significant effect on loan
repayment.
It is important to note here that these coefficients measure only the partial (direct)
effects of a change in price on each of the three choices. Since borrower choices are
interdependent, the full effect of a price change on loan amount and repayment
choices would depend on the magnitude of the change in price and also credit and
demographic characteristics of the borrower. Consider the loan amount choice: If the
price on three year contracts increases by a small amount, a few marginal borrowers
would switch to five-year contracts and their new loan term and new loan prices will
affect their loan sizes. The borrowers who did not switch away from 3-year contracts
will now decrease their loan sizes because now they face a higher price. However, if
there is a large increase in the price of 3-year loan contracts, many more borrowers
may switch to 5-year contracts and hence the full effect on loan size can be even
bigger.
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The full effect of a price change on loan repayment can be even more complicated
since both loan maturity and loan amount would change with a price change and the
new values of both these variables affect loan repayment. Hence, the full effects of
price changes can be ambiguous until we can pin down the original change in price
for each borrower. This will be explained more in the counterfactual section of this
paper where I calculate the full effects of a given change in the price distribution on
all three choices of borrowers.
1.5 Counterfactual
The main question I want to answer using this counterfactual experiment is how
would borrower decisions change if they are offered prices which were determined
by market forces of supply and demand within this online P2P credit market? To
carry out this experiment, I first need the set of prices (interest rates) for 3-year and
5-year loans that would have been offered to each borrower under this counterfactual
scenario. Although one could find out a comparable set of prices for each borrower in
an existing offline credit market, such prices would include the costs to lenders which
are specific to an offline market. Recall the online P2P market contains at least 1.5
million lenders competing to finance loans in a single market. As explained in the
institutional background, the lender costs would be different in this online market
from those in an offline market.
1.5.1 Exploiting the Change in Pricing Mechanism
Fortunately for this counterfactual experiment, Prosper.com used to operate an auc-
tion pricing mechanism to determine the price of each loan applicant who would
post a listing on its website prior to Dec. 20th, 2010. At that time, the platform
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allowed the lenders to collectively determine the price for each loan using a multi-
agent auction. Figure 1.3 provides an illustration of the differences in prices for
observationally similar borrowers under these two pricing mechanisms around the
time when the change was implemented.
Next, I explain the details of the auction pricing mechanism. Each borrower i
posts a listing of amount Li and a reserve price P¯i, which is the maximum interest
rate he would be willing to pay for that loan if it gets funded. Then each lender j
posts a bid of amount aij < Li as investment in the loan to borrower i along with a
minimum interest rate that is willing to accept pij < P¯i. If the desired loan amount
of borrower i is raised by the time the listing period of seven or ten days is over, he
gets the loan i.e. if
∑
j aij ≥ Li, the loan gets funded and the contracted final price
of the loan is determined by the price of the lender who is excluded from the auction.
This is explained as follows:
Given an orderd bid profile of prices
⇀
pi = (pi1, . . . , piJ),
let
q = min{r |
r∑
j=1
aij ≥ Li, r = 1, . . . , J}
Then the final contracted price for loan to borrower i is given by Pi = pi,q+1 and
each lender’s final investment lij is given by
lij =

aij, if j < q
Li −
∑q−1
j=1 aij, if j = q
0, if j > q
I exploit this unique pricing mechanism for a credit market to estimate the price a
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borrower would have to pay when the market determines the price he is charged. To
be more specific, I match borrowers under the two pricing mechanism based on a rich
set of borrower and market characteristics to find out the prices a borrower under the
posted-pricing mechanism would have paid under the auction-pricing mechanism.
On the other hand, under the new posted-pricing mechanism, the platform itself
would set the price for each loan Pi and in doing so the platform eliminated the
auction pricing mechanism completely. This means that the prices were no longer
determined by the market but instead were determined according to the platform’s
profit maximization condition. Note that now both borrowers and lenders were price
takers and each lender only decides how much to invest in each loan by observing
the price and riskiness of the loan.
1.5.2 Estimating the Pricing Function
Given this nice change in pricing mechanism, I match borrowers under the two mech-
anisms based on a rich set of credit variables for each borrower and macroeconomic
variables at the time a borrower applied to get a loan. Owing to the inefficiency
of simple matching procedures in high dimensions, I turn the problem the problem
into a prediction problem: I first use machine learning techniques to predict the final
auction-determined price, P , for each borrower under auction pricing mechanism.
This yields a pricing function with a very low pseudo out of sample prediction er-
ror (root MSE of 2%). Then I use this estimated pricing function to predict the
counterfactual prices for borrowers under the posted-price mechanism. I should note
here that when approximating an unknown function from the data, if the aim is
simply to predict well on another sample generated from the same distribution as the
original sample one must avoid overfitting and this is where machine learning can be
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extremely useful.
Here I explain the methodology of predicting the auction-determined price, P ,
for loans funded in the auction mechanism by using borrower characteristics and
macroeconomic variables during that time. I will give a brief overview of sample
splitting and random forests, which is a machine learning technique that gave the
lowest pseudo-out-of-sample RMSE in this application.
Sample Splitting: Let there be let there by i = 1, . . . , N borrowers with data
{(P1, X1) , ..., (PN , XN)} = (P,X) ∼ D
where Pi is the auction-determined price for borrower i and Xi is a vector of k
borrower and market specific variables.14. The objective here is to estimate Pi as
a function of Xi such that the estimated function can predict the prices for a new
sample of borrowers drawn from the the same distribution D.
To do this as efficiently as possible one must avoid overfitting and simply aim to
reduce the out-of-sample prediction error. The problem here is that we can never
truly get a precise estimate of this out-of-sample error because we do not observe
the outcome variable for the new sample. However, we can use sample splitting to
calculate pseudo out-of-sample error as illustrated below. Let
Pi = f(Xi)
To decide which functional form of f to pick, I designate a randomly selected part
of the sample as a training sample and the other part as a test sample. The training
sample is given by Z = (P1, X1) , ..., (PM , XM), whereas the test sample is given by
14Here I have collapsed the state of the world index into the borrower index i for simplicity.
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Z ′ = (PM+1, XM+1) , ..., (PN , XN). In applied machine learning, a rule of thumb is
to use a 2-to-1 split and it works quite well and the results are not very sensitive to
small deviations around this rule. The point of sample splitting is to use the training
sample to approximate the function, f , and use it to predict the outcome for the test
set. Since we do have the actual outcome variable for the test set, we can calculate
the prediction error as the mean squared error (MSE).
MSEout−of−sample =
1
N −M
N∑
i=M+1
(
Pi − fˆ (Xi)
)2
Random Forests: Following the classic text of Hastie et al. (2009), I take the
following steps to build the random forest:
(i) Draw a bootstrap sample Z∗b of size M from the training sample Z
(ii) Grow a random-forest tree Tb to the bootstrapped data as follows:
Select r variables at random from the m variables in X, where m ≤ k. Then
define a pair of half-planes as follows:
R1 (j, s) = X | Xj ≤ s
and
R2 (j, s) = X | Xj > s
where j is the index of the splitting variable 15 and s is the point at which the
split is made called split point. Starting with the base node at the top of the
15This is not to be confused with sample splitting.
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tree, the rule for that node is formed by the following optimization problem:
min
j,s
min ∑
xi∈R1(j,s)
(yi − c1)2c1 + minc2
∑
xi∈R2(j,s)
(yi − c2)2

The inner optimization problem is solved by setting c equal to the mean of
outcome variable for the observations in that partition. The key issue here is
picking the right split point, s. Once the split point has been found, the same
procedure is then performed on each resulting partition until the reduction in
squared prediction error falls under a predefined threshold.
(iii) Repeating step 2 across B trees constructed from B bootstraps results in a
forest of random trees {Tb}Bb=1. Finally, the regression predictor for the true
function is given by:
fˆBrf (x) =
1
B
B∑
b=1
Tb(x)
There are several benefits to calculating the counterfactual prices this way. First,
it does not reflect any markups charged by lenders in a traditional offline credit
market which suffers from its own frictions and their associated costs. The ideal
price vector that is required here should be determined in the exact same peer-to-
peer market where the only difference is that the lenders determine the prices instead
of the platform.
Second, the auction pricing mechanism used by Prosper.com prior to Dec 20th,
2010 was successful in the process of price discovery. This highlights the point
that the market was able to determine a fair price for each borrower. There is a
good explanation for this. Arrow et. al, 2008 present a case for the promise of
prediction markets by claiming that to predict the outcome of a future event, a
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market can be created in which a commodity is trade whose value depends on the
outcome of that future event. This will allow the market traders to aggregate all the
available information and reflect it in prices. Keeping in line with this argument,
Prosper.com essentially allowed the market to predict the future outcome of each
borrower’s repayment based on their credit variables. Moreover, Ilyer et. al, 2015
show evidence that under the auction mechanism on Prosper.com, the market the
prices determined by the market were better predictors of default than even the finest
credit score, even though the lenders could not observe the finest credit score, only
a coarser measure of it.
Third, the contracted interest rate from the auction mechanism can be predicted,
to a high degree of accuracy, from borrower characteristics using machine learning
techniques. If this exercise is done carefully, as shown above, one can get out-of-
sample error rate (root MSE) of 2%.
Fourth, it is more efficient to use this “inductive” approach in a data rich envi-
ronment to approximate the price vector instead of taking a deductive approach of
predicting such a price vector from a theoretical model. Given that the price offered
to each borrower is determined by the choices of hundreds of lenders who observe
borrower quality from about 400 variables, a comparable theoretical model must be
able to either predict how each of those 400 variables affects the interest rate based
on lenders’ expectations of loan outcomes. It can certainly be simplified by a set of
assumptions but that may make the theory incomplete.
1.5.3 Counterfactual Results
The results from the matching exercise are presented in Figure 1.4. It shows how
the change in pricing mechanism affected the prices offered to borrowers based on
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their riskiness. For each loan maturity, it shows how the difference in the platform
offered price and market determined price changed with the riskiness of borrowers.
It is evident from this figure that the risk premium charged by the platform to high
risk borrowers was lower than the risk premium charged to similar borrowers by the
market. On average, the prices are lower under the platform’s posted pricing mecha-
nism than in the auction mechanism of the market. This provides an explanation as
to what is driving the results of higher demand and slightly higher repayment when
the platform sets prices.
Next, I use the estimates of the demand and repayment model from section 4
and these counterfactual prices to predict the counterfactual choices of borrowers.
The three choices that borrowers make are (i) choice of loan maturity contract, (ii)
choice of loan amount, and (iii) choice of repayment. Upon getting these predictions,
I compare them with the model’s prediction given the actual data in which the prices
where determined by the platform. Comparisons of these choices are summarized in
Table 1.3 and Figures 1.4 to 1.6.
The average differences in the means of each variable under the two pricing mech-
anisms are shown in Table 1.3. The First thing to notice is that the market assigned
prices are on average 3% lower than the auction determined prices for 3-year loans,
and 4% lower for 5-year loans. Next, note that the average effect of the change in
pricing mechanism on the probability of picking the 5-year loan contract decreased
by 0.5 percentage point. Though the average effect is small, later I will discuss how
the effect varies with borrower riskiness.
The full effect of the change in pricing mechanism on loan size can be decomposed
into a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect looks only at the partial effect of
a change in price on the loan size. This effect ignores the fact that this same change
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in price will also affect the loan term choice of borrowers. As seen in Table 2, the
choice of loan term also has an effect on loan size. This effect of a price change on
loan size through an effect on loan term choice is the indirect effect. This is especially
important because depending on the signs and magnitudes of different coefficients,
the direct and indirect effect may go in the same or opposite direction. In the case of
equation 2 in my model, the two effects have the same sign so the full effect is bigger
than either the direct or the indirect effect. Table 1.3 shows the average direct effect
on loan size is about -$271 while the average full effect is -$1,137.
Similarly, the full effect of pricing mechanism on fraction of loan repaid is com-
posed of a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect of a change in prices on
the fraction of loan repaid does not take into account the indirect channels of effect
of the price change on loan term and loan size, whereas the full effect does take this
into account. Table 1.3 reports that the average direct effect is a -0.014 which means
that switching from platform prices to market prices decreased the fraction of loan
repaid by about 1.4 percentage points. However, when you look at the full effect of
-0.008, it is much smaller saying that the switch leads to a decrease in the fraction
of loan repaid by only 0.8 percentage point. This is because the indirect effect of an
increase in prices on loan repayment would go in the opposite direction. In Table 1.2
we can see that if there is a one unit change in interest rate, it would decrease loan
amount by $82 which should ultimately increase loan repayment by 0.03 percentage
point. So in this case the indirect effect partially dampens out the direct effect of
change in prices on loan repayment. By extension the effect of a change in the pric-
ing mechanism on loan repayment is also reduced. However, this effect changes only
slightly with credit score i.e. it is bigger by 0.002 if borrower credit score increases
by 1 point.
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When you aggregate these effects at the market level you get the total effect of
the change in pricing mechanism on the market’s performance. The direct effect on
credit demand was that credit demand fell by 2.3%, however, this was augmented by
a bigger indirect effect leading to the full effect of 9.68% decrease in total demand.
The repayment tells a slightly different story since the direct and indirect effects
work in opposite directions. The direct effect of the pricing mechanism on fraction
of loan repaid was a decrease by 1.71%, however, the full effect, which takes into
account the changes in loan size and for a few borrowers a change in loan maturity,
was a decrease by 0.8% only.
To delve deeper into the distribution of the effects presented in Table 1.3, I show
how these effects change with borrower riskiness as shown in Figures 1.5 to 1.7.
Figure 1.5 shows the average effect on the probability of picking the 5-year contract
increased with credit score. Overall this effect was positive and small for all types
of borrowers, but it was as low as 2 percent to 8 percent depending on your credit
score.
Figure 1.6 and 1.7 highlight two important points: The first, Figure 1.6, is that
the average partial effect on loan size is linearly decreasing in credit score and second,
that it is much smaller than the average full effect across borrower types. The average
full effect is in fact largest for borrowers with average credit scores while this effect is
smaller for borrowers with lowest and highest credit scores. This figure also hints at
what is driving the increased demand for credit under the platform’s posted pricing
mechanism. We can infer that the increase in total credit demand is coming from
borrowers with close to average credit scores. The drastic differences in Figures 1.6
and 1.7 highlight the importance of taking into account the interdependencies in
borrower choices, which make the full effects radically different from partial effects
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not just in magnitude but also in heterogeneity across borrower riskiness.
Figure 1.8 and 1.9 tell a somewhat different story about the effects of the pricing
mechanism on the fraction of loan repaid. Here the average partial effect, as shown
in Figure 1.8, is bigger than the average full effect, as shown in Figure1.9, and
both these effects are decreasing with credit score. While looking at the previous
results of increased loan amounts and increased probabilities of switching to longer
contracts would have raised concerns about lower repayment, we find that here the
partial effect dominates such that the full effect remains positive. This is quite an
achievement for a credit market: The platform’s pricing mechanism is able to improve
the repayment behavior of the risky borrowers. This is something traditional credit
markets have historically struggled with as highlighted in the asymmetric information
literature. While the emergence of credit scoring has definitely been helped alleviate
this problem, there is definitely room for improvement. As shown here, the platform’s
pricing mechanism has helped alleviate the problem further.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I show how different components of loan contracts affect the choice
of loan contract, loan demand and subsequent repayment choices. For that, I spec-
ify and estimate an econometric model of loan demand and repayment and exploit
unique variation in the platform’s pricing schedule to identify key parameters. I find
that a change in loan maturity has a much bigger effect on loan size and repayment as
compared to a change in loan prices. Furthermore, contract terms, including prices,
affected all choices and due to interdependencies in these choices, the partial effects
of a change in prices were much different from full effects.
Using the estimates of the model and exploiting a change in the pricing mechanism
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implemented on the platform, I conducted a counterfactual experiment in which I
predicted the loan demand and repayment choices of borrowers under the two pricing
mechanisms. I found that when the lenders collectively determine the prices of loans,
the prices were on average higher than the prices offered by the platform. This
difference was bigger for observably high risk borrowers to whom the market charges
a higher risk premium than the platform would. Additionally, under the auction
mechanism, the borrowers picked are more likely to pick loans of shorter maturity,
or smaller sizes and eventually repay smaller fractions of loans, as compared to
when the platform sets prices. Aggregated at the market level, demand for credit
and repayment of credit owed fall by 10% and 2% respectively under the auction
mechanism.
These results have important implications for how credit markets can be made to
price and allocate resources more efficiently. The above results show that when the
platform sets the prices, it is able to increase the total demand for credit without
decreasing the repayment of credit, but rather increasing the repayment slightly
too. Moreover, the benefits of the borrowers with lower credit scores increase their
demand more as compared to those with higher credit scores. By reducing the gap
between the prices charged to high and low risk borrowers, the platform was able to
increase the demand from high risk borrowers which eventually did not lead to more
defaults, but rather slightly decreased the defaults.
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Figure 1.1: The Platform Setup
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Distribution
Loan Variables Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Loan Amount ($) 11,989 7,147 4,000 10,000 21,749
Interest Rate (%) 16.03 5.52 9.20 15.35 24.24
Frac. of Owed Amt. Repaid 0.92 0.24 0.52 1 1
1{Loan Maturity = 5 yrs} 0.36
1{Loan Limit Reached} 0.08
1{Default} 0.13
Credit Variables
External Credit Score 708.53 54.19 645 713 800
Internal Credit Score (0-11) 6.10 2.48 3 6 10
Estimated Loss Rate 6.45 3.42 2.24 5.99 11.75
No. of Credit Lines 10.54 4.87 5 10 17
Years of Employment 9.27 8.46 0.92 6.92 21.33
Stated Monthly Income ($) 6,329 4,405 2,856 5,417 10,417
External Monthly Debt ($) 1,115 958 332 948 2074
Delinquencies Last 7 Yrs 3.85 9.65 0 0 14.00
Inquiries Last 6 Months 0.94 1.30 0 1 3
Bankcard Utilization 0.59 0.27 0.20 0.62 0.93
1{Home Owner} 0.53
No. of Observations 20,000
Notes: This table presents summary statistics that were calculated using
a random sample of 20,000 observations drawn from the selected sample of
74,168 observations. The external credit score refers to Experian Scorex
PLUS. Loan maturity is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if loan maturity
is 5 years and 0 if it’s 3 years.
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Table 1.2: Estimation Results
Dep. Var 1{Maturity=5 yrs} Amount ($1000s) Frac. Repaid
Marginal Effect Coefficient Coefficient
∆ Interest Rate -0.051
(0.009)
∆ Orig. Fee 0.229
(0.055)
Interest Rate (%) -0.082 -0.010
(0.031) (0.002)
Orig. Fee (%) -2.293 0.000
(0.444) (0.000)
1{Maturity=5 yrs} 2.780 -0.035
(0.117) (0.002)
Amount ($1000s) -0.004
(0.001)
1{Limit Reached} -0.002
(0.003)
No. of Observations 20,000
Controls Credit Scores, Seasonal Fixed Effects, Demographic vars.
Notes: All estimates are based on the demand and repayment model presented
in section 4. The sample used is a random sample of 20,000 observations drawn
from a selected sample of 74,000 observations. This was done to ease the com-
putational burden of the estimation procedure discussed in section 4. Estimates
in the 2nd column show the marginal effects of a unit change in each of the ex-
planatory variables on the probability of choosing the 5-year contract over the
3-year contract. For dummy variables, this is computed by taking the difference
between the probability of contract choice when the variable is equal to 1 and the
and the probability when the variable is equal to 0 (holding other variables fixed).
For continuous variables, this is computed by taking a numerical derivative of the
probability of contract choice with respect to the continuous variable. Estimates
in the 3rd column show the effects of a unit change in each explanatory variable on
loan size (in $1000s). The 4th column shows the effects of a unit change in each
explanatory variable on the fraction of payments made. Standard errors were
calculated from the numerical hessian evaluated at the estimated coefficients.
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Table 1.3: Counterfactual Results
Variable Platform Prices Market Prices
Mean Mean Mean Diff.
3-Year Prices (%) 15.99 19.01 -3.02***
5-Year Prices (%) 16.33 20.75 -4.41***
Pr. of Choosing 5-year Contract 0.211 0.206 0.005***
Loan Size Chosen (Partial) ($) 11,744 11,473 271***
Loan Size Chosen (Full) ($) 11,744 10,606 $1,137***
Fraction of Loan Repaid (Partial) 0.84 0.83 0.014***
Fractionof Loan Repaid (Full) 0.833 0.825 0.008***
Notes: This table presents the results of the counterfactual experiment. The 2nd
column shows the average of each variable when platform sets prices. Here the
price averages are coming straight from the data (i.e. rows 1 and 2 of column 2).
Rows 3 to 7 of column 2 show the average of the predicted quantities from model
fit. The 3rd column shows the same averages when the market sets the prices
under the auction mechanism. Here rows 1 and 2 of column 3 show the averages of
the counterfactual prices predicted using the high dimensional matching exercise
explained in section 5. Rows 3 to 7 of column 3 show the averages of the predicted
quantities from the model given these new counterfactual prices determined by the
market. The partial quantities in rows 4 and 6 hold fixed the other quantities that
change when prices change. Full quantities in rows 5 and 7 do not hold fixed the
other quantities that change when prices change. The 3rd column shows the mean
difference in the quantities in each row. This can be interpreted as the average effect
of a change in pricing mechanism. The significance for each effect was checked by
calculating the standard errors of mean difference using paired t-tests. Significance
level indicated as *** p ¡ 0.001
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Figure 1.2: Variation in Interest Rates Over Time
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Notes: This figure highlights the variation in the prices charged by the
platform for two sets of identical borrowers over time. The dotted line
represents borrowers who are riskier than the ones represented by the solid
line. The measure of riskiness is the estimated loss rate, a proprietary
measure of Prosper.com. The other variables of loan contract, namely loan
term and whether a borrower has taken a prior loan, are held fixed for
this figure. The flat part of each line is evidence of the fact that at any
given snapshot of time, all borrowers with the same estimated loss rate are
considered identical and are assigned the same price. The variation over
time in interest rates conditional on this risk measure is what I use in the
model in section 4 to identify my coefficients of interest.
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Figure 1.3: Change in Pricing Mechanism
Notes: This figure shows how the prices (interest rates) changed for three
narrowly defined credit categories just before and after the change in the
pricing mechanism. The new posted-pricing mechanism was implemented
on Dec. 20, 2010 and under this mechanism, the platform would set the
prices itself. Prior to Dec. 20, 2010, the price for each loan was determined
collectively by the lenders using a multi-agent decreasing price auction.
Under the auction mechanism, there is huge variation in prices for one type
of borrowers, however, the platform assigns the same price to all borrowers
in the same credit category under the posted-price mechanism.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Differences in Prices Charged by Platform
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Notes: This figure shows how the difference the prices charged by platform
and prices charged by market is distributed by borrowers’ credit scores.
The y-axis shows the platform prices in the actual data minus counter-
factual market prices predicted for the same borrower using the the high
dimensional matching exercise explained in section 5. In this binned scat-
ter plot, each point represents the average difference in the price offered to
borrower in one of the 11 credit score bins. The two graphs represent loans
of 3 and 5 year maturities.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of the Effects of Change in Pricing Mecha-
nism on Loan Maturity Choice by Credit Score
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Notes: This figure shows how the effect of change in pricing mechanism on
probability of choosing the 5 – year contract is distributed by borrowers’
credit scores. On the y – axis you have the difference in choice probability
given platform (model fit) and choice probability given market prices (coun-
terfactual) predicted only by the credit scores. To construct this binned
scatter plot, I first residualize the y and x-axis variable with respect to
controls, which are year and month dummies (Note this is the first step of
the partitioned regression). The I grouped the residualized x-variable into
20 equal-sized bins, computed the mean of the x-variable and y-variable
residuals within each bin, and created a scatterplot of these 20 data points.
For this I used the visualization method proposed by Chetty et al. (2013)
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of Partial Effects of Change in Pricing Mech-
anism on Loan Size Choice by Credit Score
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of Full Effects of Change in Pricing Mecha-
nism on Loan Size Choice by Credit Score
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This figure shows how the effect of change in pricing mechanism on loan
size is distributed by borrowers’ credit scores. On the y-axis you have the
difference in loan size given platform (model fit) and loan size given market
prices (counterfactual) predicted only by the credit scores. To construct
this binned scatter plot, I first residualize the y and x-axis variables with
respect to controls, which are year and month dummies (Note this is the
first step of the partitioned regression). Then I grouped the residualized x-
variable into 20 equal-sized bins, computed the mean of the x-variable and
y-variable residuals within each bin, and created a scatterplot of these 20
data points. For this I used the visualization method proposed by Chetty
et al. (2013). Panel (a) shows the distribution of partial effects, that holds
constant the effect of price change on loan maturity, while panel (b) shows
the distribution of full effects which take into account the effects of price
changes on loan maturity.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of Partial Effects of Change in Pricing Mech-
anism on Repayment Choice by Credit Score
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Figure 1.9: Distribution of Full Effects of Change in Pricing Mecha-
nism on Repayment Choice by Credit Score
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This figure shows how the effect of change in pricing mechanism on fraction
of loan repaid is distributed by borrowers’ credit scores. On the y – axis
you have the difference in fraction repaid given platform (model fit) and
fraction repaid given market prices (counterfactual) predicted only by the
credit scores. To construct this binned scatter plot, I first residualize the
y and x-axis variables with respect to controls, which are year and month
dummies (Note this is the first step of the partitioned regression). Then I
grouped the residualized x-variable into 20 equal-sized bins, computed the
mean of the x-variable and y-variable residuals within each bin, and created
a scatterplot of these 20 data points. For this I used the visualization
method proposed by Chetty et al. (2013). Panel (a) shows the distribution
of partial effects that hold constant the loan maturity and size, while panel
(b) shows the distribution of full effects which take into account the effects
of price changes on loan maturity and size.
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Chapter 2
Impact of Finer Credit Scoring on Borrower Behavior
2.1 Introduction
Consumer credit scoring and risk-based pricing have been widely adopted to reduce
the information asymmetry and its associated problems in credit markets. A credit
score, typically calculated by an independent credit bureau, reflects the trustworthi-
ness of an individual in a credit market, it as it allows lenders to quickly evaluate the
risk of default (or likelihood of repayment) for a potential borrower and charge an
appropriate price. This has significantly reduced screening costs for lenders over the
past two decades when lenders relied on costly interview techniques and verification
of borrower assets and income to assess his or her trustworthiness. Credit scores are
also used by uninformed parties in other markets (labor, housing) as an effort to
reduce information asymmetry. Even though credit scores are so widely used, it is
very difficult to evaluate the effect of a change in credit score on the behavior of bor-
rowers and lenders. This is because the credit scores are provided by a credit rating
agency and lenders are free to interpret the scores, and changes in those scores, in
any way they find appropriate. As explained in the paper this creates a fundamental
problem in evaluating the effect of credit scoring.
In this paper I quantify the effects of implementation of finer credit-scoring on
credit demand, defaults and repayment, in the context of a large Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
online credit platform. I exploit a unique credit market setting which provides a ma-
jor advantage to evaluate the impact of improvements of credit scoring on borrower
choices using a policy change in which the platform introduced finer credit scores
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relative to its previously coarse credit scores. The data set comes from Prosper.com,
which is a large online P2P credit platform. There are two major advantages to using
these data for evaluation of credit score improvements or implementation. First, this
is a setting in which the platform itself determines the credit risk of all borrowers
and determines the appropriate price of loan based on the credit risk and the lenders
are price takers. In this unique setting a singular change in the credit score of a
borrower results in a singular change in the price charged to that borrower. Second,
the change in credit scoring function from coarse to fine provides some much-needed
variation in credit scores and prices.
To elaborate on the importance of the first point further, consider that an im-
provement in credit scoring methodology is implemented in a traditional market for
debt in which price setting is decentralized which means each lender sets his or her
own price. In this decentralized case, a single change in the credit score (provided
by the same credit rating agency) of two identical borrowers will result in multiple
different changes in the prices charged by different lenders in the market to those two
borrowers. The final change in price will not just depend on the change in the credit
score but also depend on the choices made by the two borrowers and those choices
will depend on a range of other factors. This makes it highly likely that the two
borrowers end up paying two different prices even if they have the same credit score.
Consequently, the changes in the two prices originating from a single change in credit
score will also be different. In a nutshell, the one-to-one relationship between credit-
score and price is broken in a traditional credit market with decentralized pricing
but remains intact in the setting of the P2P credit market used in this paper.
In a setting where a single change in credit score results in multiple different
prices charged creates a problem to evaluate the effect of a change in credit score on
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borrower choices. However, in this paper, we have the centralized case, in which both
the credit scoring and price determination is done by a single agent (the platform),
and thus, a single change in the credit scores of two identical borrowers will result
in a single change in the prices charged to those two borrowers.
The second advantage of the data and setting mentioned above provided enough
detail in the data to evaluate the effect of the policy using a continuous treatment
variable instead of considering the policy just as a binary treatment. Due to this,
I was able to take into account the fact that different agents were impacted differ-
ently by the policy when evaluating its effect on borrower outcomes. To do this, I
first measured the heterogeneity in the treatment levels for all agents and use that
variation in the treatment to estimate its average effect. While earlier literature has
mostly treated implementation of credit scoring as a binary policy, I went further to
estimate the effect of a unit change in price due to better credit scoring on borrower
choices. Essentially, I estimate the effect of the implementation of finer credit scoring
in a more realistic way in which treatment is continuous rather than assuming that
all borrowers were treated equally and consider the treatment to be binary. Although
the study is focused on a single platform which has its own idiosyncrasies, it is more
representative of the wider consumer credit market than some of the earlier studies
which focused on individual institutional lenders adopting credit-scoring technologies
(Einav et. al 2013). By focusing on an entire platform, which works like a market-
place, I was able to study how borrower behavior changes in of a competitive online
market.
Theoretically, when information asymmetry in a market is reduced and the prices
change to reflect the new set of information, it is not exactly clear how the previously
informed set of agents would behave. Similarly, in a credit market, with the imple-
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mentation of credit scoring it is not exactly clear how borrowers would respond to
changes in prices. A typical borrower is expected reduce the loan amount requested
if the interest rate increased for him, given everything else stays constant. However,
a risky borrower, who has a higher probability of default, would be less sensitive to
price in his choice of loan amount as compared to how sensitive a less risky borrower
will be to a change in price. In the case of this paper, price is increasing for risky bor-
rowers and decreasing for less risky borrowers. Hence, the magnitude of the average
effect from a unit increase in price will depend on the distribution of different types
of borrowers and the levels of price differences they face with the implementation of
credit scoring.
The default and repayment choices of borrowers are also going to differ depending
on the riskiness of the borrower because, by definition, the riskiness of a borrower
reflects the expected ex-ante repayment outcome of the borrower. However, when
the prices change in a way that a high-risk borrower’s price is increased while a low
risk borrower’s price is decreased, the average effect could be ambiguous. While a
decrease in price would decrease the likelihood of default, it also leads to an increase
in requested loan amount which in turn may increase the likelihood of default.
To follow the earlier literature and highlight the importance of using continuous
treatment, I also estimated the effects of the change in policy on borrower choices
by considering the policy change as a binary treatment. For the binary treatment
case, I find that the policy increased the average requested loan amount by about
8.7% ($684) which amounted to about $684 on average, decreased the likelihood of
default by about 0.027 and increased the fraction of principal loan amount repaid by
0.02. The main findings of the paper are the ones when the treatment is considered
continuous (as argued above). These findings show that a 1% increase in interest
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rate due to finer credit scoring leads to a 0.01 increase in the fraction of borrowers
who default and about 0.02 increase in the fraction of loan principal repaid.
For the continuous treatment case, since treatment levels can be positive, negative
or 0, it makes sense to interpret the findings separately for the two groups of agents
depending on the sign of treatment since positive and negative cancel each other
out and the average treatment level is closer to 0. For the subset of borrowers who
received positive treatment (price increases), the average treatment level was 1.1%
which lead to an average decrease in loan amount by 0.29% ($24), an average increase
in the fraction of borrowers who defaulted by 0.011 (65 borrowers), and an average
increase in the fraction of loan repaid by 0.026 ($196). On the other hand, for the set
of borrowers who received negative treatment (price decreases) the average treatment
level was -1.5% which lead to an average increase in loan amount by $37, an average
decrease in the fraction of borrowers who defaulted by 0.015 (123 borrowers), and
an average decrease in the fraction of loan repaid by 0.035 ($290).
The effects on mean loan amount and mean loan repayment appear to be small
but statistically significant. However, the effect on the number of people who default
on loans is substantial. Comparing the results of the binary treatment with the ones
with continuous treatment, one can immediately spot the differences in the effects and
their signs. In a case where the two effects were similar, it would not matter much to
use either type of treatment variable. However, given that the continuous treatment
carries more information and gives a more comprehensive picture of the effects of
the treatment, it is clearly the preferred approach. Furthermore, the findings of this
paper contribute to the empirical evidence that improves our understanding of how
reduction in information asymmetry affects the choices of the previously informed
party in the context of a credit market. Although the study is focused on a single
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platform which has its own idiosyncrasies, it is more representative of the wider
consumer credit market than some of the earlier studies which relied on data from
individual lending firms.
2.1.1 Related Literature
My paper contributes to two strands of literature on the development of credit mar-
kets. First is the impact of credit scoring, either implementation for the first time or
improvements in it, on the actions of market participants and eventually the market
structure. Earlier papers by Edelberg (2006), and Grodzicki (2012) study the impact
of credit scoring adoption on development of credit markets. They find that with
the adoption of credit scoring and risk-based pricing in traditional credit markets,
the correlation between loan pricing and default risk has increased. However, these
papers study these issues in the context of a whole economy and rely on aggregate
and survey data to conduct their empirical analysis. In contrast, I use individual
decision and transaction level data from an entire marketplace which permits a more
detailed analysis. A more closely aligned paper to my paper is by Einav et al.
(2013a) in which the authors use data from a large car financing company to show
how the adoption of credit scoring for the first time affected the profitability of loans
as lenders substituted credit scores for various types of local information. A recent
paper by Cox (2017) studies the student loan market in which risk-based pricing by
private firms coexists with flat prices for all loans provided by public entities. The
paper shows how less risky borrowers move out of the government pool and opt for
risk-based pricing which leads to an increase in consumer surplus.
A second strand of literature this paper contributes to is the research on P2P
online credit markets and online markets in general. Rahim (2017) makes builds
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a model of borrower demand and repayment to show how partial effects of price
changes are different from full effects while taking choice of loan maturity into ac-
count. He further shows how the platform is able to increase the demand for credit
and reduce defaults by setting prices itself which are, on average lower than those
set by the market. Papers by Pope and Sydnor (2011) and Ravina (2013) show how
an applicant’s personal characteristics (for example outward appearance and skin
color) can affect her probability of getting a loan. Iyer et al. (2016) provide evidence
that the market is able to determine interest rates that predict defaults better than
the finest credit scores do, and Zhang and Liu (2012) provide compelling evidence of
investor herding behavior in P2P online credit markets.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2.3, I give an overview of
the institutional background of P2P online credit markets, explain the how the new
policy was implemented and what it did exactly, and discuss descriptive statistics
from the data. In section 2.4, I explain the two parts of the empirical strategy (with
binary and continuous treatment) to answer the questions motivated above and show
the results from each of the two parts of the empirical analysis. Section 2.5 provides
concluding discussion and policy implications of the findings.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
2.3 Data and Institutional Background
2.3.1 Institutional Background
Over the past decade more than a thousand P2P online credit platforms have opened
up across the world.1 In the three biggest markets, China, United States and United
1Americas Alternative Finance Benchmarking Report, 2015
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Kingdom, cumulative loan volumes by Dec. 2015 reached $70 billion, $25 billion,
and $7 billion, respectively.2 In 2014 in U.S. alone, the five biggest platforms issued
$3.5 billion in loans compared to $1.2 billion in 2013. However, this makes up a sliver
of consumer debt in U.S. To put things in perspective, total outstanding credit card
debt in the United States grew to $880 billion by July 2014. According to a Fitch
report (Fitch (2014)), the market volume in P2P online credit markets may grow to
$114 billion in the medium term.3 The U.S. market is dominated by two competing
platforms named Lending Club and Prosper which together have a market share of
over 90% in P2P small personal loans.
In a typical online P2P credit market borrowers seek loans from a group of lenders
by posting their credit information on the platform website. The platform performs
initial screening of borrowers, collects credit information, and sets loan contract
terms including loan maturity, interest rate, and transaction fees. Individual and
institutional investors decide how much to invest in each loan based on their own
preferences. In this market, in its current form, the set of prices is controlled by the
platform while both borrowers and lenders are price takers and pick their own allo-
cations. Rahim (2017) provides an extensive discussion about how these platforms
operate and how they differ from offline credit markets with a particular focus on
the advantages and disadvantages for borrowers and lenders to participate in such a
market.
2.3.2 Implementation of finer credit scores
The platform I study operates as a marketplace for small personal loans to prime
borrowers within the United States. The loans do not require a collateral and they
2Citi Group Report, 2016
3Federal government data aggregated by www.nerdwallet.com
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are not monitored by the platform or the lenders. As discussed earlier, the platform
used risk-based pricing for all loans. It used data from a credit bureau as an input
to the its proprietary credit scoring algorithm to determine a borrower’s default risk.
Different borrowers were assigned to different risk categories and at any given time,
all borrowers with the same risk score were charged the same price. The policy in
question made these risk categories smaller.
On July 20, 2012, the platform implemented finer credit scoring in which it
increased the number of risk categories from 8 to 49. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict
this change in the platform’s risk-to-price function before and after the policy. Each
point in these figures represents a price-risk pair with price on the vertical axis and
risk on the horizontal axis. Each level of risk represents a separate risk category and
is assigned a separate price. In the pre-policy period (Figure 2.1), the risk categories
were fewer and hence coarser than they became the time period after the policy was
changed (Figure 2.2). With this policy, the borrowers in each older risk category
were further classified into several risk categories.
A crucial thing to note in figures 2.1 and 2.2 is that price is a linear function of
the risk level and this function remained unchanged after the under the new credit
scoring policy. As explained later in the empirical strategy section, this fact helps
with the identification strategy in the estimation procedure. Further evidence of the
implementation of this policy can be found in the tabulated pricing functions of the
platform reported in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 in the appendix. Figure 2.4 shows that prior
to the implementation of the new policy for each narrowly defined credit category,
the platform assigned a single price for all borrowers in that category. However,
Figure 2.5 shows that after the new policy was implemented, the platform would
assign a range of prices (denoted by minimum and maximum) for each narrowly
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defined category. With some data mining, I was able to figure out that within each
credit category, the platform assigns a single price to all borrowers with the same
risk score.
2.3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The data for this paper come from Prosper.com which is the second largest peer-
to-peer internet credit platform in the U.S. by loan volume. These data contain all
required loan specific and borrower specific variables. For each loan, I observe the
amount of loan, maturity period, interest rate, loan amount repaid (till the end of
sample) and time stamps for loan application, issuance and repayment. For each
borrower I observe a rich set of credit variables from the Experian credit bureau,
Prosper.com’s own credit score, credit grade and demographic variables. Identifiers
for each loan application, loan and borrower allows for seamless merging of different
parts of the database. Owing to the online nature of the platform, it can implement
big changes to the workings of the market very quickly and at scale. To address this
issue, I used 54 snapshots of Prosper.com from internet archives to look for changes
in borrowing and lending processes over time. These proved to be quiet useful in
isolating a time period no major changes took place. Furthermore, I used some
macroeconomic variables taken from the website Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED) maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
In Table 2.1, I report a comparison of the summary statistics of loan contract
and credit variables as well as those of loan outcomes for a period of four months
before the policy was implemented and four months after it. Since the policy was
implemented on July 20, 2012, I select this sample of eight months to conduct my
empirical analysis similar to a window study analysis. Table 2.1 shows significant
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changes in basic choices of borrowers: the average requested loan amount is about 700
dollars larger after the policy, the average probability of default decreased by about
2 percent and the average fraction of loan repaid increased by about 1.7 percent after
the policy. Furthermore, the average external credit score is only about 1 percent
higher for borrowers after the policy and the average internal loss rate, which is
analogous to the proprietary risk score of the platform, is only about 0.1 percent
smaller for borrowers after the policy. Note that both the internal and external
credit scores represent borrower riskiness in a way that the higher the score the
less risky the borrower is. Table 2.1 also shows that the average difference in the
interest rates is very low at about -0.3 percent and the average difference in loan
maturity is less than a month. All these differences, except the home-owner status,
are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 ATE with Binary Treatment
I use propensity score matching as a first step in my empirical strategy to estimate the
effects of implementing the policy discussed above. For this, I first create an eight-
month time window in a way that the date for policy change falls in the middle of
this time window. I select all the loan applications made between the dates of March
20, 2012 and November 20, 2012. The treatment is defined as the implementation
of the finer credit scoring function. Since this function was implemented on July 20,
2012, all the observations between March 20, 2012 and July 19, 2012 make up the
control group, while all the observations between July 20, 2012 and November 20,
2012 make up the treatment group.
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To implement the propensity score matching method to estimate the Average
Treatment Effect (ATE), I first estimate the probability for each observation to be-
long to the treatment group given the set of covariates on which the loan applications
need to be matched. This is done by logit regression as follows
p(xi) = Λ(Di = 1 | Xi = xi)
where Di is an indicator equal to 1 if borrower i belongs to the treatment group
and it equals 0 if borrower i belongs to the control group. X is a matrix of the match-
ing covariates and p() is the propensity score function that needs to be estimates.
The ATE is then estimated by using a matching algorithm in which the matching is
done on the propensity score.
2.4.1.1 Results from Propensity Score Matching
Tables 2.2 presents the results from Propensity Score Matching estimation. The
effect of finer credit scoring on requested loan amount is positive and statistically
significant as shown in column 1. I find that requested loan amount increased by
8.7 percent due to the change in policy, given everything else as equal. Given the
average requested loan amount was 7,862 dollars, the policy increased the average
requested loan amount by 684 dollars.The set of matching variables used included
the loan contract variables, interest rate and contract length, as well as a large set
of variables from the borrower credit profile. The matching procedure was successful
in creating a balanced sample and the bias from each matching covariate was less
that 5 percent in the balanced sample. Details about the efficiency of the matching
process are given in Tables A.1 to A.4 of the appendix.
To estimate the effect on defaults and percent of loan principal repaid, the sample
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was reduced to only those borrowers who were actually issued loans because these
borrowers were able to raise the required amount by the lenders to convert the loan
applications into loans. In column 2, I report the effect of the policy on the likelihood
of default is negative and statistically significant. I find that the likelihood of default
decreased by 2.7 percent due to the implementation of new policy. Another measure
of loan repayment is the fraction of loan principal amount repaid. In column 3, I
report the estimate of the effect of finer credit scoring on fraction of loan principal
repaid and the effect is positive and statistically significant. The average borrower
repaid 2.4 percent more due to the implementation of the new policy and this finding
further supports the earlier finding of a negative effect of the policy on the likelihood
of default.
As a robustness check that I used for was to use an alternative estimation tech-
nique. For this I used ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress each outcome variable
above on the treatment and all matching variables. The results from these estima-
tions are shown in Table 2.3. Although the estimates from OLS and Propensity Score
Matching are not directly comparable since the two techniques are, by definition, dif-
ferent and they estimate slightly different functions, the magnitudes of the effects are
close enough and their signs are also the same. Hence, these results further support
the results from the main specification of propensity score matching.
2.4.2 ATE with Continuous Treatment
In the previous section, I assumed that all borrowers were treated equally by the
policy which essentially means that all agents received the same level of treatment.
The purpose of the previous section was to relate this paper to the existing literature
in which such a treatment was considered binary, and also establish a baseline case
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for the findings when the assumption of binary treatment is relaxed. In this section
I take into account the fact that different agents were impacted differently by the
policy when evaluating its effect on borrower outcomes. To do this, I first measure
the heterogeneity in the treatment levels for all agents and use that variation in
the treatment to estimate its average effect. Essentially, I estimate the effect of the
implementation of finer credit scoring in a more realistic way in which treatment is
continuous.
Due to the variation in the treatment levels in terms of changes in prices, one
should expect variation in the responses to treatment levels. The nature of the
policy change was such that some borrowers were better off while others were worse
off with the new policy. This means that some borrowers faced price increases,
making them worse off, while others faced price decreases, making them better off.
It is important to note here that this situation is representative of a setting in which
the implementation or improvement of credit scoring helped to distinguish agents
based on the credit-worthiness. Despite the heterogeneity in treatment levels, earlier
literature mostly considered this a binary treatment. A key contribution in this paper
is that I consider this to be a continuous treatment with the intention of estimating
more realistic and precise average treatment effects.
To estimate the average effect of the difference in price on borrower outcomes of
interest, I first aggregated the data at the level of risk category defined by the level
of Estimated Loss Rate (ELR) under finer (new) credit scoring policy. Define ∆Yj as
the mean difference in the outcome variable within category j, before and after the
implementation of policy. Within each category, the main outcomes of interest were
the number of borrowers who applied for loans, the mean loan amount, the fraction
of borrowers who defaulted, and the mean fraction of loan repaid. Similarly, define
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∆Pj as the mean difference in the prices charged to all identical borrowers within
category j. Once they are constructed (as explained below), the average treatment
effect of the change in prices can be estimated with OLS where each observation is
weighted by the number of borrowers of category j in the market. To be precise, I
estimate the following regression using weighted OLS for different outcome variables
of interest:
∆Yj = β0 + β1 ×∆Pj + εj
Where ∆Pj = P
new
j − P oldj and P tj denotes the price charged to all borrowers in
category j in time period t for t ∈ {old, new} denoting pre-policy and post policy
time periods respectively. Even though the price is the same for every borrower in the
same category and same time period, this price may vary over time. In cases where
this price varied over time, P tj was constructed by taking the weighted average of the
prices over time within the given category j for the given time period t. However,
to actually get to the final measure of ΔPj and subsequent measures of ∆Yj, I first
classified all borrowers under the old credit scoring policy according to the new credit
scoring policy and the details of it can be found in the next section.
As noted above, ∆Yj is defined as the mean difference in the outcome variable
within category j, before and after the implementation of policy. For each outcome
variable, ∆Yj is defined as follows for each of the three estimations:
Difference in the mean loan amount requested within category j:
∆Yj =
1
nnewj
nnewj∑
i=1
(
log
(
LoanAmountnewij
))− 1
noldj
noldj∑
i=1
(
log
(
LoanAmountoldij
))
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Where LoanAmountij is the requested loan amount by borrower i in credit cate-
gory j, and ntj denotes the number of borrowers in category j in time period t. Time
period new is defined as the period after the new policy was implemented and time
period old is defined as the period before the new policy was implemented.
Difference in the fraction of borrowers who defaulted within category
j :
∆Yj =
1
nnewj
nnewj∑
i=1
(
Defaultnewij
)− 1
noldj
noldj∑
i=1
(
Defaultoldij
)
Where Defaulttij is equal to 1 if borrower i in category j repaid less for a loan
that was issued in period t and Defaulttij is equal to 0 if that borrower repaid in
full.
Difference in mean fraction of loan repaid within category j:
∆Yj =
1
nnewj
nnewj∑
i=1
(
Repaymentnewij
)− 1
noldj
noldj∑
i=1
(
Repaymentoldij
)
Where Repaymenttij ∈ [0, 1] is the exact fraction of loan principal repaid by
borrower i in category j for a loan that was issued in time period t. Finally, to account
for the variation in the number of borrowers within each risk category, I weighted
each observation by total the number of borrowers in category j as a fraction of the
total number of borrowers in the market. This weight is defined below:
Weightj =
nnewj + n
old
j∑J
j=1
(
nnewj + n
old
j
)
Where J is the total number of credit categories.
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Matching Borrowers Under Two Credit Scoring Regimes
As mentioned earlier, to construct the variables defined above and to measure the
different treatment levels of all borrowers, I need to classify these borrowers into
different credit score categories according which as defined by the finer (newer) credit
scoring function. For the borrowers who were issued loans under this new regime,
this is simply the credit category they were assigned by the platform so it is already
defined in the data. However, for borrowers under the old regime, I conducted a
matching exercise. To explain this, I turn to the details of how the platform’s its
internal risk scores changed and how the platform used these scores to determine
prices.
Let there be two types of borrowers: a low risk type denoted by L and a high risk
type denoted by H. Before the policy, both these sets of borrowers were considered
identical in terms of their repayment probabilities and so their estimated loss rate was
the same, denoted by ¯ELR. Based on this, these borrowers also faced the same price
denoted by P¯ . After the policy was implemented, the platform could distinguish
between L − type and H − type borrowers and hence assigned ELRh to high risk
type and ELRl to the low risk type. The corresponding prices for these types were
P h and P l. Here ELRh > ¯ELR > ELRl and P h > P¯ > P l.
With the impact of policy, the H − type borrowers face a higher price after the
policy and this difference is calculated as P h–P¯ > 0. Similarly, the L−type borrowers
face a lower price after the policy and this difference is calculated as P l–P¯ < 0. Once
the change in price for each type of borrowers is calculated, it can be used as the
treatment level for that type and estimate the average treatment effect of the policy
more realistically.
The key challenge in calculating ∆Pi is that ELRnew is not observable for bor-
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rowers who applied for loans before the policy was implemented. To address this
challenge, I use machine learning to estimate a function that predicts ELRnew from
borrower credit variables and macroeconomic variables at the time of loan applica-
tion. It is essential to note here that the platform itself uses these same variables
to assign ELRnew to each borrower and since I observe all these, I estimate this
function directly from the data. This can be done using OLS too, but since it is
a pure prediction problem, I expanded the set of techniques to include some from
the machine learning literature and evaluated the performance of each technique
using pseudo-out-of-sample Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE). The random forest
algorithm gave the lowest RMSE of 0.0054 and also gave out-of-sample R-Squared of
0.98 which is why I picked it as the final estimation technique for predicting ELRnew.
Alternative techniques, like Lasso and Ridge gave slightly higher RMSE of 0.0066
and 0.0076, respectively.
With this estimated function I predicted the ELRnew for borrowers in the pre-
policy period and this gave me a single measure of borrower type according to the
platform’s new policy. Furthermore, I used this ELRnew to find the closest match
for each borrower from the pre-policy period to a set of borrowers in the post-policy
period to assign Pnew to each borrower in the pre-policy period. Similarly, I used
this matching variable to assign P¯ to each borrower in the post-policy period based
on the closest match for that borrower from the pre-policy period. As defined above,
I calculated the ∆Pi for each borrower given the complete sets of prices.
Figure 2.3 shows the empirical distribution of ∆Pi and it can be seen that for a
large number of borrowers, the difference in price was close to zero while there was
non-trivial mass on either side of zero. This Figure highlights my point earlier that
not all borrowers were equally treated by the policy. Instead, some borrowers were
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better off from this policy since they received a price decreased while some others
received a price increase. Intuitively, the borrowers who received a price decrease
would be the ones who were of lower risk type but the platform assigned grouped
them with higher risk types and thus charged a higher price. Similarly, the borrowers
who faced an increase in the price were the ones who were benefitting from a lower
price before the policy because the platform grouped them with lower risk type
borrowers. This highlights an important feature of the variation generated in prices
due to this policy: the direction and magnitude of the price difference is not random
but is determined by the difference in the platform’s estimates of the two risk scores
(loss rates) for each borrower.
Given this variation in prices it is not exactly clear how borrowers would respond
to changes in prices. A typical borrower should reduce the loan amount requested
if the interest rate increase, given everything else stays constant. However, a risky
borrower, who has a higher probability of default, may also be less sensitive to price
in his choice of loan amount as compared to a less risky borrower. In the case
of this paper, price is increasing for risky borrowers and decreasing for less risky
borrowers. In this case the magnitude of the average effect from a unit increase in
price will depend on the distribution of different types of borrowers and the levels
of price differences they face with the implementation of this policy. Furthermore,
the default and repayment choices of borrowers are also going to differ depending on
the riskiness of the borrower because the by definition, the riskiness of a borrower
reflects the expected ex-ante repayment outcome of the borrower. However, when
the prices are change in a way that a high risk borrower’s price is increased while a
low risk borrower’s price is decreased, the average effect could be ambiguous. While
a decrease in interest decrease the likelihood of default, it also leads to an increase
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in requested loan amount which in turn may increase the likelihood of default.
2.4.3 Estimation Results
As discussed earlier, the main coefficient of interest is the coefficient on ∆Pi which the
average treatment effect using a continuous measure of treatment. Earlier discussion
implies that the sign of this coefficient, in the cases for all three outcome variables,
could be positive or negative depending on the composition of borrower applicant
pool and their sensitivity to price changes. In Table 2.4, I report the results for
the average treatment effect on mean loan amount. Column 1 reports the results
with just one covariate which is ∆Pi, column 2 reports the results with an indicator
for when ∆Pi is greater than 0 and column 3 reports the results when both these
covariates are included in the regression. The purpose of including the indicator for
when ∆Pi is greater than 0 is to consider relate these results to the binary treatment
case of the previous section. Column 1 shows that a 1% increase in interest rate
lead to a 0.29% decrease in Mean Loan Amount and this coefficient is statistically
significant4. Given the average requested loan amount before the new policy was
introduced was $7,862, a 1% increase in interest rate lead to an average decrease of
$245. Column 2 shows that the binary treatment indicator is statistically insignificant
from 0 and column 3 shows that the inclusion of this binary indicator together with
the ∆Pi does not make either of the two coefficients much different from their values
and significance levels from columns 1 and 2.
To estimate the average treatment effect on the fraction of borrowers who de-
faulted and on the mean fraction of loan repaid, the sample is reduced to include
4exp(25.796/100)–1 = 0.294
5Note a 1 unit increase in price difference is like the interest rate (price) on a loan increased
from 7% to 107%. Therefore, I interpret the coefficients with a 1% increase in interest rate which
is equivalent of going from 7% to 8%.
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only those borrowers who were actually issued loans because they were able to raise
the required amount by the lenders. Table 2.5 shows the treatment effects on the
fraction of borrowers who defaulted. Column 1 shows that a 1% increase in interest
rate lead to an increase of 0.01 in the fraction of borrowers within a bin who de-
faulted. Lastly, I report the results for the effects on mean fraction of loan repaid in
Table 2.6. Column 1 shows that a 1% increase in interest rate lead an increase of 0.02
in the mean fraction of loan principal repaid and this result is statistically significant.
Given the average fraction repaid is about 0.83, a 1% increase in interest rate lead
that fraction to increase to 0.85. Note that this is well below full repayment rate of 1
so we still see defaults. Note that this variable is a fraction of the loan amount. On
the other hand, the fraction of borrowers who defaulted is fraction of the number of
people in their credit category.
Since treatment levels can be positive, negative or 0, it makes sense to interpret
the findings separately for the two groups of agents depending on the sign of treat-
ment since positive and negative cancel each other out and the average treatment
level is closer to 0.
Table 2.7 shows the summary statistics of the treatment level and the outcome
variables for two subsets of the sample based on the sign of the treatment level i.e.
those borrowers who received price increases (∆Pi > 0) and those who received price
decreases (∆Pi < 0). Note that about 41.9% of borrowers received a price increases
with an average increase of 1.1% while 58.1% of borrowers received price decreases
with an average decrease of 1.5%. Hence, the distribution of treatment levels is
skewed to the left and this can also be seen in figure 2.3.
For the subset of borrowers who faced price increases, the average increase in
price was 1.1% and given an average loan amount of $7,536, it led to an average
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decrease in the loan amount of approximately $24. Furthermore, a treatment level
of 1.1% lead to an average increase in default fraction by 0.011 i.e. from 0.137 to
0.148. Given the number of borrowers in this subset was about 5,944, this increase
of 1.1% in price lead to an increase in the number of borrowers who defaulted by 65.
In the proper context, this seems to be quiet significant. Lastly, this 1.1% treatment
level lead to an average increase in fraction of loan repaid by 0.026 i.e. from 0.859
to 0.885. Given an average loan amount, this effect was of an increase in repayment
amount of approximately $196.
For the subset borrowers who received price decreases, the average decrease in
price was 1.5% and given an average loan amount of $8,277, it lead to an average
increase in loan amount of approximately $37. Furthermore, an average decrease in
price by 1.5% lead to an average decrease in default fraction by 0.015 i.e. from 0.213
to 0.198. Given the number of borrowers in this subset were 8,228, this 1.5% decrease
in price lead to a decrease in the number of borrowers who defaulted by 123. Finally,
a decrease in price by 1.5% lead to an average decrease in fraction of loan repaid by
0.035 i.e. from 0.757 to 0.722. Given an average loan amount, this effect amounted
to an average decrease in repayment amount by approximately $290. The effects on
loan amount and fraction of borrowers who defaulted have the expected signs but
the positive sign on the effect of price increase on fraction of loan repaid is positive
which is surprising. However, note that even though an increase in price leads to
an increase in the fraction of loan repaid, this effect is small to change the default
outcome of the borrower. The borrower may pay a little more, but eventually will
default on the loan since default is defined is paying strictly less than the entire loan
amount. In case of a price increase, the average repayment increases from 0.859 to
0.885 which still well below 1. One could argue that since the loan is smaller, the
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fraction of repaid is higher because the borrower might be paying approximately the
same amount, but this seems unlikely since the decrease in loan amount is of only
$24 for borrowers who faced price increases. The effect on fraction of borrowers who
defaulted may seem small in absolute terms, but it is essentially the most significant
when interpreted in the proper context. This effect is in terms of number of people
who defaulted instead of the monetary loan value. For the subset of borrowers who
received price increases, the average price increase of 1.1% lead to 65 more borrowers
to default. Likewise, for the set of borrowers who face price decreases, the average
decrease of 1.5% lead to 123 fewer borrowers to default.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I show evidence of how borrower loan outcomes change due to the
implementation of finer credit scoring in the context of a large P2P online credit
platform. I used micro data at the level of individual borrower decisions and loan
transactions and exploited a change in the credit scoring policy of the platform to
conduct my empirical analysis. In the first part of my analysis showed that, if one
simply considers the policy as a binary treatment in this market, its effects of on
borrower outcomes can be estimated using propensity score matching in which the
matching was done on a rich set of borrower and loan characteristics. I find that the
policy increased the average requested loan amount by about 8.7% which amounted
to about $684 on average. Additionally, I find that the policy decreased the likelihood
of default by about 2.7% and increased the fraction of principal loan amount repaid
by 2.4%. The matching process was successful in creating balanced matched samples
and these results were shown to be robust to alternative estimation technique.
In the second part of my empirical analysis, I relax the assumption that the policy
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treated all borrowers equally by considering the treatment variable to be continuous.
By examining the implementation of the policy in detail, I classified the borrowers by
their risk levels as measured by the finer credit scoring implemented by the platform.
The findings from this part of my analysis showed that for the subset of borrowers
who received price increases, the average treatment level was 1.1% which lead to an
average decrease in loan amount by 0.29% ($24), an average increase in the fraction
of borrowers who defaulted by 0.011 (65 borrowers), and an average increase in the
fraction of loan repaid by 0.026 ($196). On the other hand, for the set of borrowers
who received price decreases the average treatment level was -1.5% which lead to
an average increase in loan amount by $37, an average decrease in the fraction of
borrowers who defaulted by 0.015 (123 borrowers), and an average decrease in the
fraction of loan repaid by 0.035 ($290).
The effects on mean loan amount and mean loan repayment appear to be small
but statistically significant. However, the effect on the number of people who default
on loans is substantial. Comparing the results of the binary treatment with the ones
with continuous treatment, one can immediately spot the differences in the effects and
their signs. In a case where the two effects were similar, it would not matter much to
use either type of treatment variable. However, given that the continuous treatment
carries more information and gives a more comprehensive picture of the effects of
the treatment, it is clearly the preferred approach. Furthermore, the findings of this
paper contribute to the empirical evidence that improves our understanding of how
reduction in information asymmetry affects the choices of the previously informed
party in the context of a credit market. Although the study is focused on a single
platform which has its own idiosyncrasies, it is more representative of the wider
consumer credit market than some of the earlier studies which relied on data from
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Before After
Loan Apps. Mean SD Mean SD Mean Diff. p-value
Loan Amount 7862 5404.99 8580 6159.34 717.56 ¡0.00001
Interest Rate 0.23 0.07 0.22 0.08 -0.003 0.002198
Ext. Credit Score 714 50.27 716 49.05 1.310 0.03475
Loss Rate 0.094 0.049 0.093 0.051 -0.001 0.01964
Listing Term 43.347 42.963 -0.385 0.01619
1(Prior Loans) 0.195 0.396 0.184 0.388 -0.011 0.02752
1(Home Owner) 0.492 0.500 0.497 0.500 0.005 0.4273
# Loan Apps. 12,633 13,004
Loans Issued
Default rate 0.234 0.424 0.211 0.408 -0.023 0.001
Fraction repaid 0.832 0.327 0.849 0.314 0.017 0.002
No. of Loans 6,977 7,195
individual lending firms.
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Table 2.2: Propensity Score Matching Results
Ln (Loan Amt.) Default (0/1) Fraction repaid
Policy (ATE) 0.087*** -0.027** 0.020**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Controls Loan Contract, Credit, Macroeconomic variables
Num. of Obs 25,637 14,172 14,172
Notes: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. Significance level indi-
cated as *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 2.3: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Policy
Log (Loan Amt.) Default (0/1) Fraction repaid
Policy (ATE) 0.066*** -0.015* 0.011*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Controls Loan Contract, Credit, Macroeconomic variables
Num. of Obs 25,637 14,172 14,172
Notes: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. Significance level indicated
as *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 2.4: Effect of Difference in Price on Difference in Mean Loan Amount
∆Mean Log (Loan Amt.) ∆Mean Log (Loan Amt.) ∆Mean Log (Loan Amt.)
Constant 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
∆Pj -25.796* - -23.623*
(10.823) - (11.653)
1 {∆Pj > 0} - -0.003 -0.001
- (0.002) (0.003)
N 235 235 235
Adj.R2 0.020 0.003 0.017
Notes: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. Significance level indicated as *p < 0.05, **p <
0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 2.5: Effect of Difference in Price on Fraction of Defaulted Bor-
rowers
∆Frac. Defaulted ∆Frac. Defaulted ∆Frac. Defaulted
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Pj 1.080*** - 1.078**
(0.317) - (0.329)
1 {∆Pj > 0} - 0.000 0.000
- (0.000) (0.000)
N 231 231 231
Adj.R2 0.044 -0.001 0.040
Notes: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. Significance level indicated
as *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 2.6: Effect of Difference in Price on Mean Fraction of Loan Repaid
∆Mean Frac. Repaid ∆Mean Frac. Repaid ∆Mean Frac. Repaid
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Pj 2.342*** - 2.553***
(0.589) - (0.608)
1 {∆Pj > 0} - 0.000 0.000
- (0.000) (0.000)
N 231 231 231
Adj.R2 0.061 -0.004 0.065
Notes: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. Significance level indicated as *p <
0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 2.7: Summary Statistics Based on Treatment Signs
∆Pi > 0 ∆Pi < 0
Mean ∆Pi 0.011 0.015
Mean Loan Amount $7,536 $8,277
Mean Frac. of Borrowers Defaulted 0.137 0.213
Mean Frac. of Loan Repaid 0.859 0.757
N (%) 5,944 (41.9%) 8,228 (58.1%)
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Figure 2.1: Pricing Function Before the Policy Change
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Figure 2.2: Pricing Function After the Policy Change
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Figure 2.3: Kernel Density Plot of ∆Pi
Figure 2.4: Pricing Table Before Implementation of Finer Credit
Scoring
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Figure 2.5: Pricing Table After Implementation of Finer Credit Scor-
ing
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Chapter 3
What Drives the Expansion of the Peer-to-Peer Credit?1
3.1 Introduction
First peer-to-peer (P2P) credit platforms, Zopa, Prosper and Lending Club, have
been launched in 2005-2007 in the UK and the US. These online lenders directly
match savers with borrowers who need personal and business loans.2 Although,
online credit amounts to a small share of total credit, it has been growing rapidly
(Figure 3.1) and in 2015, the flow of US online consumer credit was equivalent
to 12.5% of traditional consumer credit (Wardrop et al., 2016). Not surprisingly,
the emergence of online lenders, which are a part of the wider FinTech movement,
has provoked a debate about their ability to disrupt traditional banking (Philippon
(2015); The Economist, 2015; Wolf, 2016; Citi, 2016). Haldane (2011) suggests that
the entry of new FinTech players could diversify the intermediation between savers
and borrowers, which would make the financial sector more stable and efficient and
could ensure greater access to financial services.
The objective of this paper is to provide the first exploration of the main drivers
of the expansion of the P2P Credit in the US. Is rapid development of online lenders
due to structural factors in the brick-and-mortar banking, such as weak competition
in the consumer credit market due to high switching costs or barriers to entry? Has
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Olena Havrylchyk, Carlotta Mariotto and Marianne
Verdier
2Peer-to-peer credit was born to match directly lenders and borrowers without the use of the
intermediation of banks. However, as the market expanded, a large part of it has been funded not
by individual lenders, but traditional banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions. Hence,
the name Peer-to-peer credit has been changing to marketplace credit. In this paper we use terms
Peer-to-peer credit platforms, marketplace lenders and online lenders interchangeably.
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it been spurred by the Great Recession, bank failures, banks’ deleveraging and credit
crunch? Could the timing of the P2P Credit be explained by the spread of Internet,
sophistication of Internet users and trust in new technologies? What role do social
networks play? What are the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of
online borrowers? Ultimately, we would like to get closer to understanding whether
online lenders could be potentially disrupt the traditional banking sector.
In light of these questions, we outline three main hypotheses for the expansion of
online lenders. Our first hypothesis is that P2P Credit development could be related
to the nature of the banking competition. The banking sector is characterized by
monopolistic competition due to high entry barriers, switching costs and strong brand
loyalty (Claessens and Laeven (2004); Shy (2002); Kim et al. (2003)). Philippon
(2015) demonstrates that the cost of financial intermediation in the US have remained
unchanged since the 19 century. This fact is astonishing in the context of rapid
progress in the communication and information technologies that should have driven
down the price of financial services for end users. Hence, the entry of new Fintech
players could be needed to improve the provision of financial services and disrupt
traditional players. Indeed, online lenders argue that their operating expenses are
much lower than those of brick-and-mortar banks due to the extensive use of new
technologies as well as absence of legacy problems and costly branch networks.3 We
test the impact of the market structure on the expansion of online lenders and refer
to these explanations as competition-based hypotheses.4
3Operating expenses include the costs of originating the loan, processing payments, collection
and bad debt expenses.
4The existing literature finds weak conclusions on the relationship between innovation and mar-
ket structure (see the survey of Cohen and Levin, 2010). A number of theoretical studies (e.g.,
Gilbert, 2006) show that the competition innovation is monotonic only under restrictive conditions.
On the one hand, innovation incentives should be lower in more concentrated markets because of
the replacement effect identified by. On the other hand, innovation incentives should be lower in
more competitive environments because aggregate industry profits are lower. Aghion et al. (2005)
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The expansion of online lenders might have been spurred by the financial crisis
and the Great Recession. On the credit supply side, as interest rates approached
zero, new lenders entered the market, attracted by the higher return (and risk)
available from exposure to P2P assets. On the credit demand side, a wider and
more creditworthy pool of potential borrowers appeared as the banking sector was
weak, regulation has tightened, banks have deleveraged and mistrust in the banks
has spread (Atz and Bholat, 2016). As shown by figure 3.2 below, total consumer
credit significantly decreased in the years 2008-2011. The credit rationing may have
spurred the demand for alternative forms of financing.
For example, Hasan et al. (2009) show that bank instability in Germany has
pushed businesses to use equity crowdfunding as a source of external finance. We
refer to this explanation as crisis-based hypothesis.
It is also possible that the surge in P2P Credit is not caused by problems in the
banking sector. Online lenders claim to harness big data innovations to revolutionize
credit risk assessment and efficiently match lenders with borrowers. Furthermore,
the entry of online lenders reflects the readiness of the society to embrace internet
to perform financial transactions. Indeed, Fintech is part of the larger revolution as
new internet platforms (Amazon, Uber, BlaBlaCar and AirBnB) are on the way to
disrupt other service markets, such as retail trade, transport and accommodation.
Similar to previous financial innovation, online lenders could expand and cheapen
access to financial services (Einav et al. (2013b)). We refer to this explanation as
innovation-based hypothesis.
Sorting out these three competing hypotheses is difficult because the expansion of
the P2P Credit has coincided with the post-crisis period, increased concentration of
demonstrate that the relationship between competition and innovation should have a nonlinear in-
verted U-pattern. Other studies include measures of entry and exit in the market (Geroski (1989).
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the banking sector and the diffusion of communication and information technologies
(e.g., smartphones, broadband). Our identification strategy relies on the exploration
of the geographic heterogeneity of the P2P Credit expansion at the county level. The
choice of the local dimension of a market is relevant for consumer and SME credit
that are targeted by online lenders. The county unit is the standard definition of the
local banking market in the literature (e.g., Hannan and Prager (1998); Berger et al.
(1999); Rhoades et al. (2000); and Black and Strahan (2002)).
Since the expansion of the P2P Credit is similar to the diffusion of other tech-
nologies, it could be explained by spatial network effects due to human interactions
(Comin et al. (2012)). Notwithstanding the online nature of the P2P Credit, geogra-
phy might still play a crucial role in its diffusion. Indeed, we document an important
spatial correlation, as P2P Credit per capita is higher in counties close to California,
New York and Florida. Hence, our econometric approach relies on incorporating a
spatial lag variable in our model. 5
This paper contributes to the nascent literature on the Peer-to-peer credit. The
largest strand of this literature explores how borrower characteristics affect loan
outcomes and how lenders on P2P platforms mitigate informational frictions (see the
literature review by Morse (2015)).6 The only paper that explores how borrowers
choose between traditional and alternative sources of finance is Butler et al. (2016),
5This hypothesis is different from but related to the study by Agrawal et al. (2011) who find
that crowdfunding largely overcomes the distance-related economic frictions as the average investor
is not in the local market but is 3,000 miles away. Our hypothesis that the expansion of the P2P
Credit exhibits spatial correlation does not contradict the fact that investors could be located far
away.
6Morse (2015) provides a literature survey of papers that study how P2P Credit mitigates
information frictions by relying on real world social connections (Freedman and Jin (2008); Everett,
2010), textual analysis of successful funding bids (Mitra and Gilbert (2014)), psychology text mining
techniques to uncover deception (Gao and Lin (2013)), identity claim methodology to identify
trustworthy and hardworking borrowers (Herzenstein et al. (2011)) as well as discrimination (Ravina
(2013); Pope and Sydnor (2011); Duarte et al. (2012)).
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who show that borrowers who reside in areas with good access to bank finance request
loans with lower interest rates.
This paper makes the first attempt to analyze the expansion patterns of online
lenders. For the first time, we aggregate data for the two leading P2P consumer
credit platforms in the US - Prosper and Lending Club – and study the geography
of online lenders. We measure the expansion of the P2P Credit by aggregating the
number and the volume of loans provided by these two online lenders. As early as
2007, 1183 counties had P2P borrowers, and their number has increased to 2609 in
2013. We then use this data to relate the amount of P2P Credit to a wide range of
county level determinants that could affect the speed of its penetration.
By focusing on the expansion of a new technology, our paper is related to the
literature on the diffusion of innovation (Bass (1969) and Rogers (2003)).7 The
literature on financial innovation is scarce and focuses on the new products and
distribution channels in the traditional banking (Frame and White (2014)). Most
of these studies have focused on users’ incentives to adopt innovations according to
their individual characteristics.8 DeYoung et al. (2007) and Hernando and Nieto
(2007) analyze the impact of the adoption of online banking on banks’ profitability
and find that the Internet channel is a complement to rather than a substitute for
physical branches.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the institutional
environment in which Peer-to-peer credit platforms evolve. In section 3.3, we explain
how we assemble our data set, provide data sources and variable definition. In section
7Rogers (2003) argues that the more people that use a technology, the more non-users are likely
to adopt.
8Frame and White (2014) mention three different types of innovations: products and services
(e.g., subprime mortgages, new means of payment and online banking), production processes (such
as Automated Clearing Houses, small business credit scoring, asset securitization, risk manage-
ment), organizational forms (such as Internet only banks).
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3.4, we explain our identification strategy and provide empirical results. In section
3.5, we conclude.
3.2 Institutional Environment of Peer-to-Peer Credit Plat-
forms in the United States
Online credit marketplaces are platforms that connect individuals or businesses wish-
ing to obtain a loan with individuals and institutions willing to commit to fund this
loan. Marketplace credit encompasses P2P Credit platforms, which offer credit-
based crowdfunding for consumers and small businesses, and online credit platforms
by large institutions (e.g., OnDeck Capital, Kabbage), which offer credit exclusively
to businesses, rather than consumers.9 In our paper, we focus on P2P Credit plat-
forms, on which multiple lenders lend small sums of money online to consumers or
small businesses with the expectation of periodic repayment.
Prosper Marketplace and Lending Club launched the first online P2P Credit plat-
forms in the United-States respectively in 2006 and 2007, followed by other companies
such as Upstart, Funding Circle, CircleBack Credit or Peerform. Between 2006 and
2015, the two most important platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, have facilitated
approximately $8.7 billion loans.10 Both platforms believe that their online market-
place model has key advantages relative to traditional bank credit both for borrowers
and investors, among which convenience of online operations, automation, reduced
cost and time to access credit.
Consumer loan amounts vary between a minimum loan of $1,000 for Prosper and
$500 for Lending Club and a maximum loan of $35,000 for both platforms ($300,000
9Other types of crowdfunding include donation or reward-based crowdfunding.
10The figures and information of this paragraph is based on the study of Prosper and Lending
Club annual reports, which can be found on the companies’ websites.
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for businesses). They fund various types of projects ranging from credit card debt
consolidation to home improvement, short-term and bridge loans, vehicle loans or
engagement loans.11
Prosper and Lending Club rely on a partnership with WebBank, an FDIC-insured,
Utah-chartered industrial bank that originates all borrower loans made through their
marketplaces. In December 2014, Lending Club became the first publicly traded on-
line Peer-to-peer credit company in the United-States, after its Initial Public Offering
on the New York Stock Exchange.
As in many other two-sided markets (Rysman (2009)), online credit marketplaces
try to attract two different groups of users, namely borrowers and investors, by choos-
ing an appropriate structure of fees that increases the size of network effects. On
the borrower side of the market, both companies compete with banking institutions,
credit unions, credit card issuers and other consumer finance companies. They also
compete with each other and with other online marketplaces such as Upstart or
Funding Circle. Platforms claim that their prices are lower on average than the ones
consumers would pay on outstanding credit card balances or unsecured installment
loans funded by traditional banks.12 Online marketplaces perform the traditional
screening function of banks by defining various criteria that must be met by bor-
rowers. Any U.S. resident aged at least 18 with a U.S. bank account and a social
security number may apply and request a loan, provided that the platform is autho-
rized in her/his state. Platforms collect online some information about the applicant
(i.e., FICO score, debt-to-income ratio, credit report variables, etc.), which is used
11Consumer credit does not include credit for purchase of a residence or collateralized by real
estate or by specific financial assets like stocks and bonds.
12This view is confirmed by a study conducted by Demyanyk and Kolliner at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. They offer time-series evidence that, on average, marketplace loans carry lower
interest rates than credit cards and perform similarly.
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to compute a proprietary credit score. Some additional enquiries may also be per-
formed offline (e.g., employment verification). Consumers are divided into several
rating segments, which correspond to different fixed interest rates ranging from 6%
to 26% for Lending Club in 2014. Origination fees paid to the platform depend on
the consumer’s level of risk.
On the investor side, online credit marketplaces face potential competition from
investment vehicles and asset classes such as equities, bonds and commodities. Pros-
per claims to offer an asset class that has attractive risk adjusted returns compared to
its competitors. Investors can be divided into two different populations: individuals
and institutions. Both populations are subject to different requirements. Individual
investors must be U.S. residents aged at least 18, with a social security number,
and sometimes a driver’s license or a state identification card number. Institutional
investors must provide a taxpayer identification number and entity formation docu-
mentation. Investors’ annual income must exceed a floor defined by platforms’ rules.
Prosper and Lending Club issue a series of unsecured Notes for each loan that are
sold to the investors (individual or institutional), and recommend that each investor
diversifies his/her portfolio by purchasing small amounts from different loans.13 Each
investor is entitled to receive pro-rata principal and interest payments on the loan,
net of a service charge paid to the platform. In addition to the “Note Channel”,
Prosper has designed specifically a “Whole Loan Channel” for accredited investors
(according to the definition set forth in Regulation D under the Securities Act of
1933), which must be approved by the platform. Accredited Investors can purchase
a borrower loan in its entirety directly from Prosper.
The credit market in the United-States is subject to many regulations, which are
13Notes can be viewed as debt-back securities.
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changing continuously (e.g., State Usury Laws, State Securities Laws, Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Truth-in-Credit Act. . . ). Online
credit platforms need to obtain a license to operate in a given state and comply
with all existing regulations on consumer credit. For example, currently, Lending
Club does not facilitate loans to borrowers in Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska and
North Dakota, but has obtained a license in all other jurisdictions. Furthermore,
state and local government authorities may impose additional restrictions on their
activities (such as a cap on the fees charged to borrowers) or mandatory disclosure of
information. In some states, platforms are opened to borrowers but not to investors,
or vice versa. Authorizations can also differ for Prosper and Lending Club.
An important issue is the potential violation of states’ usury laws. The interest
rates charged to borrowers are based upon the ability under federal law of the issuing
bank that originates the loan (i.e., WebBank) to “export” the interest rates of its
jurisdiction (i.e., Utah) to other states. This enables the online marketplace to
provide for uniform rates to all borrowers in all states in which it operates. Therefore,
if a state imposes a low limit on the maximum interest rates for consumer loans,
some borrowers could still borrow at a higher rate through an online marketplace
since the loan is originated in Utah.14 Some states have opted-out of the exportation
regime, which allows banks to export the interest rate permitted in their jurisdiction,
regardless of the usury limitations imposed by the borrower’s state.
14Of the fourty-six jurisdictions whose residents may obtain loans in the United-States, only seven
states have no interest rate limitations on consumer loans (Arizona, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah), while all other jurisdictions have a maximum
rate less than the maximum rate offered by WebBank through online marketplaces.
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3.3 Data
To construct variables about the diffusion of P2P Credit, we rely on loan book data
from Lending Club and Prosper Marketplace. For Lending Club we have 376 261
observation points, corresponding to a total volume of funded loans equal to $3.2
billion, starting from January 2007 to December 2013. This amounts to 99.25%
of the Lending Club portfolio. For Prosper we have 88 988 observation points,
corresponding to a total volume of originated loans equal to $662 million, starting
from January 2006 to 30 October 2013. This amounts to 100% of the total Prosper
portfolio. There are 313 counties with zero P2P loans in our final dataset.
Since loan book data provides information about each borrower’s city, we can
assign a county name to each borrower by matching with an official data containing
US States, cities and counties.15 Our analysis ends in 2013, because platforms have
stopped providing city names afterwards. Due to missing values and mistakes in city
names, we lose 4.8% of the volume of funded loans in the Lending Club dataset and
10% from the Prosper dataset. Next, we aggregate this data at the year-county level
to construct two measures of P2P Credit diffusion: number of P2P loans per capita
and volume of P2P Credit per capita. For large cities belonging to multiple counties,
we split the total data between counties weighted by total income per county. Table
3.1 shows the total volume of funded loans, the number of counties and the total
number of loans that we have in our dataset.
We can now map the depth of the P2P development at the county level for each
year (Figures 3.3 to 3.). As early as 2007, 1183 counties had P2P borrowers, and their
number has increased to 1881 in 2010 and to 2609 in 2013. For cross-sectional regres-
15We use the Americas Open Geocode (AOG) database. Source: http:/
www.opengeocode.org/download.php.
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sions, we aggregate yearly data for each county and, then, merge our dataset with
other datasets that contain our explanatory variables. Our specification accounts for
a large number of county characteristics that could influence the expansion of the
P2P Credit.
Crisis variables
To measure the effects of the financial crisis on the penetration of the P2P Credit, we
rely on two types of variables. First, we compute the share of deposits in each county
affected by bank failures during the analyzed period. To do this, we merge FDIC
Failed Bank List with the data on branches of these banks in each county from the
FDIC Summary of Deposits. This is an exhaustive database about all branches of
deposit taking institutions in the US, providing data on the amount of deposits at the
branch level. We then compute the share of deposits held by failed banks in a county
i in the total amount of deposits held by all banks in a county i as of 31 December,
2013. As shown by Aubuchon et al. (2010), there is a wide geographic heterogeneity
with respect to bank failures in the US and it is possible that customers from counties
that have been the most affected by the crisis have relied more on alternative credit
providers. If our crisis-related hypothesis is confirmed, we expect a positive sign on
this variable.
Our second measure of the depth of the financial crisis relies on the FDIC Sum-
mary of Deposits to identify the presence of branches in each county that we merge
with information on capital at the bank consolidated level, taken from Call Reports.
This measure is based on the assumption that banks’ capital management is done at
the consolidated level (Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010). We rely on two measures of
capital (unweighted leverage ratio and risk-weighted tier 1 capital ratio) computed
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during the crisis period 2009-2010.16 Solvency ratio of a county i is computed as
an average capital ratios of banks present in a county i weighted by deposits of
their branches in county i. If our crisis-related hypothesis is confirmed, we expect a
negative sign on this variable.
Measuring competition and brand loyalty
Ideally, we would like to explore banking competition, but this is notoriously difficult
to measure, particularly at the county level. The FDIC Summary of Deposits allows
us to compute concentration measures, such as HHI and C3 indices, as well as branch
density per 10000 population. To eliminate any endogeneity due to reverse causality,
we estimate these variables in 2007. Since some studies show that market structure
could be unrelated to the banking competition (Claessens and Laeven (2004)), we
prefer to refer to these measures as market structure or concentration measures.
Market structure measures could be correlates of bank quality and brand loyalty.
In particular, branch density measures the outreach of the financial sector in terms
of access to banks’ physical outlets (?; Beck et al. (2007)). Branch density is also a
measure of the quality of the overall bank network and could play an important role
in the bank’s advertising strategy to develop brand loyalty (Dick (2007)). Indeed,
branches are a form of advertising for banks. Dick (2007) provides plenty of anecdotal
evidence on how banks hope to attract customers using their branches, usually with
stylish merchandising and customer service. Banks become more visible to consumers
through their branches; in fact, banks are known to put clocks outside their branches
for this reason. Importantly, there is evidence that banks open branches mostly in
16We define these two years as crisis-years because bank capital ratios and loan growth were at
their lowest and bank failures and credit-card delinquencies at the highest during this period. This
allows us to capture the severity of the crisis.
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response to their own market targets, as opposed to their existing customers’ needs.
Banking sector is a highly concentrated market with high switching costs. If bank
customers wanted to switch to P2P Credit, they would need to incur learning costs
about P2P platforms, transaction costs to set up their profile, describe their loan
(a task that is performed by their credit officer in a bank), as well as to overcome
brand loyalty. Since our study is done in the homogeneous institutional environment
in the context of switching to one of the two very similar credit platforms, learning
and transaction costs should be similar across counties. We control for educational
attainment and age, which could be correlated with learning costs. The remaining
geographic heterogeneity in banking concentration could be a subjective measure of
brand loyalty.
In light of this discussion, the impact of the concentration measures on the ex-
pansion of the P2P Credit could be interpreted differently. A positive correlation
between market concentration and P2P Credit platforms could signal that customers
from highly concentrated markets try to switch to alternative, less costly providers.
A negative correlation, on the contrary, could signal that high market concentration
reflects high brand loyalty, which slows down the penetration of the P2P Credit.
Finally, since credit marketplaces operate online, their entry decision at the
county level is exogenous and it is not correlated to the density of bank branches.
Measuring openness to innovation and new communication and infor-
mational technologies
To proxy for openness to innovation, we use U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
data to compute the number of patents per capita. This measure is often used as
a measure of innovation and, as such, it has a number of shortcomings, since some
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innovations are not patented and patents differ enormously in their economic impact.
Nonetheless, our objective is not to measure innovation per se, but rather to account
for a local culture that has a high propensity to generate innovative ideas and, hence,
accept innovative ideas of others. Such culture could be more open to new forms of
financing though P2P Credit.
To measure the penetration of internet at the county level, we rely on the NTIA’s
State Broadband Initiative that allows us to compute the following measures: 1)
percent of county population with access to any broadband technology (excluding
satellite); 2) percent of county population with access to Mobile Wireless (Licensed)
technology; 3) percent of county population with access to upload speed 50 mbps
or higher. Each measure is computed as an average between 2010 and 2013, the
only data available at the county level. All these variables should have an expected
positive sign if our innovation-based hypothesis is confirmed.
Socio-economic characteristics
We control for the socio-economic characteristics, such as age, education attainment,
population density, poverty level, race etc. We expect that counties with higher
educational attainment, higher population density and higher proportion of young
people, should have higher levels of P2P Credit penetration because human capital
and network effects of urban areas are significant predictors of the technological
diffusion. These characteristics could also be correlates with brand loyalty.17
As to poverty rate and race, we have no theoretical priors about the sign of their
impact. Racial minorities might be less familiar with online credit opportunities,
but their demand could be higher because race identification is no longer possible
17Surveys have found that consumer credit use is greatest in early family life stages when the
rate of return of additional goods that might be financed using credit is high.
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on P2P Credit platforms.18 Interestingly, racial identification was possible during
earlier years of the P2P Credit when borrowers had the possibility to post a pic-
ture. This has led to the well documented discrimination of racial minorities on
the Prosper credit platform (Pope and Sydnor (2011); Ravina (2013); Duarte et al.
(2012)). Consequently, platforms have removed the possibility of posting a photo
which has made the identification of borrowers’ race impossible. This could incen-
tivise racial minorities to turn to the P2P platforms to avoid discrimination that is
well documented in traditional credit markets (see a literature review by Pagern and
Shepherd, 2008).
We introduce state level dummies to control for differences in state-level regula-
tion of consumer credit and P2P Credit platforms, as well as other state character-
istics that are not captured by our county-level variables. These dummies account
for the fact that Iowa was closed for borrowers from both Lending Club and Prosper
platforms, while Maine and North Dakota were closed for Prosper platform.
Spatial relations
Our data contain explicit spatial relationships, as counties are likely to be subject
to observable and unobservable common disturbances which will lead to spatial cor-
relation. This could be explained by various channels of interdependence due to
regional business cycles and economic shocks, technology diffusion, access to bank
branches, policy coordination, regional disparities for which we do not control with
our right-hand variables (see e.g. Garrett et al. 2005 for the importance of spatial
correlation in state branching policy). Spatial correlation could also occur because
of the boundary mismatch problems when the economic notion of a market does
18However, the platforms have removed the possibility of posting the photo, which has made the
identification of borrowers’ race impossible.
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not correspond well with the county boundaries (Rey and Montouri (1999)). Spatial
correlation is particularly important for the diffusion of technology due to a theory
of human interactions (Comin et al. (2012)). Borrowers from P2P Credit platform
require acquiring knowledge about their existence, as well as trust in their reliability,
which often comes from interactions with other agents. The frequency and success of
these interactions is likely to be shaped by geography. Hence, we expect that knowl-
edge about P2P potential is likely to be more easily transmitted between agents in
counties that are close than between counties that are far apart. Figure 3 also attest
to this hypothesis. To account for spatial correlation, we introduce a spatial lag in
our model.
Overall, we have sufficient cross-sectional data for 3,059 out of 3,144 counties and
county equivalents. Table 3.2 provides summary statistics.
3.4 Methodology
A. Model specification: a spatial autoregressive model
Our objective is to test
(i) The three hypothesis on the adoption of P2P lending (See Section 3)
(ii) Whether adopting P2P lending in a county has a positive impact on the adop-
tion of P2P lending in neighboring counties
We specify the following regression model, also known as a SARAR model in the
literature (See Anselin et al. (1980)):
yi = β0 + λWy−i + β1 × Competitioni + γ × Crisisi + δ × Innovationi +X ′iα + ui
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where
i, j = 1, ..., n
and
ui = ρ
n∑
j=1
wijuj + εi
with
εi ∼ N
(
0, σ2I
)
Where i and j denote one of the n counties, yi is the log of our observed de-
pendent variable, that is either the volume of P2P Credit per county per capita or
the number of P2P loans per county per capita. Wy−i =
∑n
j 6=iwijyj is a weighted
average of P2P Credit per county per capita of other counties, known as a spatial
lag, where the weights are determined by an N × N spatial weights contiguity ma-
trix W =
∑n
j 6=iwij where each element wij denotes the degree of spatial proximity
between county i and county j.19 λ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient; β1 is the
coefficient of our observed independent variables regarding competition and market
structure; γ is the coefficient of variables regarding the credit rationing; δ is the coef-
ficient of our variables regarding the innovation and internet variables; α is a vector
of coefficients for our socio-economic and demographic variables ; ρ is the spatial
autoregressive coefficient as, in our model. We allow the error term to be affected
19The matrix W we use is a “minmax-normalized” matrix where the (i, j)
th
element of W becomes
wij = wij/m, where m = {maxi (ri) , maxi (ci)}. Here maxi(ri) is the largest row sum of W and
maxi(ci) is the largest column sum of W . We also use the inverse-distance matrix composed of
weights that are inversely related to the distances between the units, and we obtain similar results
in our regression. Obtaining similar results with an inverse-distance and a contiguity matrix is
consistent with the findings of LeSage and Pace, 2010.
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by the disturbances of neighbors; εi and ui are unobserved error terms.
Thus, this model specification accounts not only for spatial correlation of the
dependent variable, but also for spatial correlation within the error terms, which
could be affected by unobservable factors such as regional economic cycles. Ignoring
spatial relation, in this case, could potentially lead to inconsistency in the standard
errors.
Our main parameters of interest are the coefficients β, γ, δ, α and λ . The param-
eters β, γ and δ measure the marginal impact of market structure variables, crisis
variables, innovation variables as well as socio-economic and demographic variables
on the adoption of P2P Credit in each county. When the dependent variable is the
volume of P2P loans per capita, the magnitude of the coefficients β, γ, δ, α predict
of how many dollars the volume of P2P loans will increase or decrease for a one
unit increase of the control variable. When the dependent variable is the number
of loans, the magnitude of the coefficients β, γ, δ, α predict how many additional or
less loans there will be following a one unit increase of the control variable. Finally,
λ measures how the adoption of P2P Credit in a given county positively impacts
neighbor counties. If this coefficient is significantly greater than 0, we can conclude
that there is a correlation between the adoption of P2P Credit between neighboring
counties.
To compute our cross-sectional spatial regressions, we use the Maximum-Likelihood
Estimator method20, as the OLS estimation will be biased and inconsistent due to
simultaneity bias (See Anselin, 2003 and LeSage and Pace, 2009 for a theoretical ex-
planation on why MLE solves the simultaneity bias). As a matter of fact, the spatial
lag term must be treated as an endogenous variable since the volumes of loans in
20The maximum likelihood estimator method relies on the assumption that the error terms are
normally distributed.
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contingent counties are simultaneously impacting one another.
Our findings are presented in Tables 3.3, 3.4, B.1 and B.2 and they all show that
we always reject the null hypothesis that the spatial lag lambda is greater or equal to
0. Spatial lag is always positive and statistically significant, pointing to the existence
of strong spatial effects. In other words, the higher the level of P2P loans in one
county, the higher it is going to be in the contingent counties.
OLS vs. SARAR
Since from the SARAR model the estimates for the coefficients ρ and λ are sig-
nificantly different from zero, ordinary least-squares may lead to inconsistent esti-
mations. Table B.3 in the Appendix shows the estimates from the OLS regression
model. If we compare these estimates to the output from our SARAR model, we
realize that they are mostly biased up words as in LeSage (2008).
3.4.0.1 Estimation Results
The SARAR model estimates cannot be interpreted as partial derivatives like in the
typical regressions (see LeSage and Pace (2009)). Therefore the coefficients cannot be
interpreted as marginal effects of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable
in one region, because a change in the explanatory variable is likely to impact the
dependent variable in all neighboring regions too. In subsection A we will discuss
the short-run impacts of a change in the explanatory variables on the volume and
number of P2P Credit per capita in each county. In subsection B, we will compute
the average total direct impact (ATDI), the average total indirect impacts (ATII) and
the average total impact (ATI) which is the sum of the direct and indirect impacts.
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Empirical results: short run impacts of the explanatory variables on the
dependent variable
Table 3.3 and table 3.4 present our empirical findings for the P2P expansion (in
terms of volume and number of loans respectively) as a function of different county
characteristic, with a particular focus on crisis and competition characteristics.
Among socio-demographic variables, higher population density, higher educa-
tional attainment, lower levels of poverty, lower levels of income and higher share of
Hispanic and Black minorities have a positive and significant impact on the expan-
sion of the P2P Credit. An increase of population density by one standard deviation
significantly increases the volume of the P2P Credit and the number of loans. An
increase of bachelor graduates by one standard deviation significantly increases the
volume of the P2P Credit and the number of loans. An increase of the share of His-
panic minorities by one standard deviation increases the volume of the P2P Credit
and the number of loans. As reported in table B.3, this result is driven by Lending
Club. Also, an increase of the share of Black minorities by one standard deviation
increases the number of the P2P loans, but does not affect the volume. An increase
in the percentage of people leaving under the poverty line decreases the volume of
P2P Credit and the number of P2P loans. Also, the income per capita affects neg-
atively only the volume of loans: an increase in the income per capita decreases the
volume of P2P loans. The variables measuring the age of the population are never
significant for these specifications.
Our finding that the expansion of the P2P Credit is faster in counties with higher
share of Black and Hispanic minorities could be a sign of higher demand from these
areas to escape discrimination in traditional credit markets. As online lenders have
removed the possibility to post a photo, identifying the race of the borrower has
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become much more difficult. During our sample period, 2007-2013, investors had
access to the information on the location of borrowers. Although this information
could have been used by institutional investors as a proxy for race, it is unlikely
that retail investors would do that. Recently, any information on the location of the
borrower has been removed, which makes the identification of the race completely
impossible. Hence, racial discrimination is not anymore possible in the online credit.
The positive effect of the higher educational attainment is consistent with the
fact that human capital is a significant predictor of the technological diffusion and
could diminish switching costs due to lower cost of learning. A positive effect of
population density reflects the existence of network effects in urban areas that is
another well-known predictor of the diffusion of new technologies.
As to the crisis variables, our findings show that in both specifications of tables
3.3 and 3.4, the leverage ratio is statistically significant and has a negative effect
on P2P Credit expansion both in terms of volume and loans. A decrease of the
leverage ratio during the financial crisis increases the volume of credit, and increases
the number of loans. The share of deposits affected by failed banks and the Tier
1 capital ratios during the crisis did not have an impact on the diffusion of P2P
Credit. This finding is consistent with the idea that leverage ratios appear to be
better predictors of future banks’ performance and problems (Blundell-Wignall and
Roulet (2013); Haldane (2011) and Haldane (2012)) with respect to weighted leverage
ratios, since weights may be inconsistent and subject to manipulations (Mariathasan
and Merrouche (2014)); Le Lesl and Avramova, 2012; Haldane (2012); FSA, 2010).
Most of P2P borrowers use credit platforms to consolidate and manage their credit
card debt and a minority borrow for business purposes. To account for difficulties
in the credit card market, we test the robustness of our results by constructing two
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additional crisis variables: percentage change in credit card debt balance per capita
and percent of credit card debt balance with more than 90 days of delinquency
during crisis years. The data comes from the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel
/ Equifax that is available only for 2220 counties. None of these variables turns out
to be statistically significant. Results are available upon request.
In addition, Table 3.3 and table 3.4 present the empirical findings for the P2P
expansion as a function of market structure variables. Our findings demonstrate that
low branches density in 2007 is a statistically significant driver of the P2P Credit.
We interpret this result as a suggestion that customers living in counties with low
outreach of traditional banks and low quality of financial services are more likely to
turn to P2P Credit due to weaker brand loyalty. Counties that had one standard
deviation less branches in 2007, experienced an increase in the average volume of
P2P Credit and an increase in the number of P2P loans.
Turning our attention to concentration measures, both our concentration mea-
sures C3 and HHI have a negative and statistically significant sign. In other words,
P2P Credit penetrates fewer counties with higher concentration of the largest three
banks and with a higher overall traditional banking market concentration. This is
consistent with the interpretation of the high market concentration as an outcome of
high switching costs due to strong brand loyalty. An increase of the concentration of
the three biggest banks by one standard deviation diminishes the average amount of
the P2P Credit and the number of loans, whereas an increase in the concentration of
the whole traditional banking market in one county diminishes the average amount
of P2P Credit and the number of loans.
We additionally test the impact of the alternative consumer credit providers,
such as payday loans. To do so, we use County Business Patterns to construct
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the ratio of non-bank establishments that are related to consumer credit and credit
intermediation per capital (Bhutta, 2013). We find that P2P Credit is more diffused
in counties with a higher number of payday loan establishments. In particular,
an increase in the number of payday loans establishments increases the volume of
P2P Credit at a 10% level of significance. This might reflect a higher demand for
alternative consumer credit.
Table B.1 and table B.2 present results with variables that capture the geographic
heterogeneity of the innovation, measured by the quality of Internet connection and
by the number of patents issued by each county. Since the variable which measures
the number of patents is correlated to the level of education, we performed one spec-
ification excluding the level of education, and found that it is statistically significant
and with a positive sign. Counties with density of patents that is one standard de-
viation above the average exhibit a higher volume of P2P Credit and an increase in
the number of loans. Among the variables describing the quality of Internet, only
broadband and mobile are statistically significant and have a negative sign only when
the dependent variable is the volume of loans. High Internet quality and speed do
not impact the number of P2P borrowers.
To compare the expansion patterns of different online platforms, we estimate the
model separately for Prosper Marketplace and Lending Club. The results, presented
in Table B.3, show that not all local characteristics play a similar role in the case
of both online lenders. The market structure variables (HHI and Branches) played
a similar role for the two platforms, whereas payday loan establishments have a
strong and positive impact only on Prosper’s volume of loans and a negative but
small impact on the number of Lending Club borrowers. Moreover, the leverage
ratio during the crisis played a role in the case of Prosper but is not significant for
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Lending Club. Interestingly, broadband access plays a positive role for the Prosper
credit, and a negative one for Lending Club volume of loans. To understand this
difference, one should remember that Proper platform had an earlier start than the
Lending Club. A large part of the Prosper’s credit in our sample has been done
in 2006-2008 and it has experienced a sharp decline in 2008-2009 due to regulatory
uncertainty about its legal status, followed by a slow expansion since 2010. The
finding that broadband access plays a role for the Prosper credit is likely to reflect
this earlier period when there was still an important geographic heterogeneity in
access to Internet. This intuition is reinforced by the estimates of the SARAR model
regressions performed each year separately, as shown in table B.4. As a matter of
fact, the negative and significant effect of broadband is present only starting from
the year 2012, whereas it is positive and significant on the year 2008 and otherwise
it is never significant.
The age structure only plays a role for Lending Club: a higher percentage of
population aged between 20 and 34 increases the volume of P2P loans but decreases
the number of loans. With respect to the minorities, counties with a higher share of
Hispanic population have a higher number of P2P loans on both platforms but only
a higher volume of Lending Club loans.
Finally, the spatial lag is always positive and significant in all the regressions,
suggesting the presence of positive spatial relations among contingent counties. It is
interesting to note from table B.4, that, starting from 2008, this coefficient increased
systematically during the years, going from 0.3777 in 2008 to 0.915 in 2013.
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Computing Marginal Effects
Following the method proposed by Drukker et al. (2013), we manually compute the
average total direct and indirect impacts of the explanatory variables (crisis, compe-
tition, innovation and socio-economic and demographic variables) on the dependent
variable (either volume or number of P2P loans per capita per county) using the
reduced-form predictors coming from the SARAR regression. Doing so allows us
to understand the magnitude of these effects. For example, as shown in table B.6,
an increase by one standard deviation of the number of branches in a given region
decreases the average volume of P2P Credit per capita of all regions by 0.0013%
(ATDI). Similarly, an increase by one standard deviation of the number of branches
in all neighboring regions, reduces by 0.0004 % the volume of P2P Credit per capita
in that one region (ATII). The signs of the coefficients are the same as the short-run
impacts shown in tables 3.3, 3.4, B.1, B.2 and B.3, and in general the direct impacts
are stronger than the indirect ones, which leads to the fact that total impacts are
composed mainly by direct impacts in our main sample.
3.5 Concluding Remarks and Future Extensions
This paper is a first attempt to explore the drivers of the expansion of online lenders.
We have proposed three hypotheses related to (1) the competition in the brick-and-
mortar banking sector and switching costs to online lenders, (2) the consequences of
the financial crisis and (3) the innovation and internet expansion. We also account
for spatial effects and socio-economic and demographic characteristics.
Our findings suggest that online lenders have made inroads into counties that
have a poor branch network. This suggests that borrowers that either live far away
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Table 3.1: Growth of P2P Credit
Lending Club Prosper
Year Vol. ($M) # Counties # Loans Vol. ($M) # Counties # Loans
2006 0 0 0 29 673 6,145
2007 2 110 246 81 1,175 11,592
2008 13 379 1,488 69 1,377 11,683
2009 46 676 4,500 9 631 2,118
2010 116 987 10,594 27 1,029 5,864
2011 257 1,359 19,861 75 1,397 11,508
2012 718 1,836 49,811 154 1,739 20,054
2013 2,064 2,384 137,824 217 1,721 21,990
from a brick and mortar bank branch or have a poor branch experience due to long
waiting times are more likely to turn to online lenders due to lower brand loyalty. We
also find that counties with a more concentrated banking structure have witnessed
slower growth of online lenders, which is also consistent with the idea of higher brand
loyalty. Higher education and higher propensity to innovate play a significant and
positive role, possibly because these characteristics diminish the costs of learning
about online lenders. Our results show that the leverage ratio during the crisis has
affected the demand for online credit. Despite the online nature of the P2P Credit,
spatial effects play a crucial role, which could be interpreted as an important role of
social interactions in building trust in online markets.
Our analysis could be extended in a number of ways. First, we would like to
use the panel nature of the data to estimate Bass model of the innovation diffusion.
Second, we would like to explore the balancing of demand and supply in the P2P
Credit. This is possible due to the information in our dataset about loan demand
that has not been met because loans have been rejected by online lenders or have
failed to attract potential lenders.
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Figure 3.1: P2P Credit growth in the US (in billions of dollars)
Figure 3.2: Total consumer loans in the USA in billions of dollars
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Prosper volume 3,059.0 13,930.0 28,786.0 0.00 777,512.0
Lending Club volume 3,059.0 81,080.0 147,689.0 0.00 4,517,468.0
Volume of P2P loans 3,059.0 95,010.0 171,766.0 0.00 5,294,980.0
Number of P2P loans 3,059.0 6.0 11.6 0.00 451.3
Crisis variables
Failed 3,059.0 0.02 0.08 0.00 1.00
Crisis Tier1 3,059.0 0.14 0.08 0.06 3.99
Crisis leverage 3,059.0 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.33
Competition variables
C3 3,059.0 0.77 0.19 0.28 1.00
HHI 3,059.0 0.31 0.21 0.05 1.00
Branches 3,059.0 15.68 17.18 0.61 216.74
Payday 3,059.0 1.01 1.25 0.00 8.67
Innovation variables
Mobile 3,059.0 0.95 0.11 0.00 1.00
Broadband 3,059.0 0.98 0.05 0.01 1.00
Speed50000k 3,059.0 0.42 0.35 0.00 1.00
Speed10000k 3,059.0 0.23 0.35 0.00 1.00
Patents 3,059.0 8.60 19.32 0.00 372.86
Other variables
Density 3,059.0 77.00 473.00 0.00 18,354.00
Age 20 to 34 3,059.0 0.19 0.02 0.09 0.32
Bachelor 3,059.0 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.61
Income 3,059.0 34,733.90 8,860.97 14,885.43 158,212.10
Poverty 3,059.0 0.17 0.06 0.03 0.50
Asian 3,059.0 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.58
Hispanic 3,059.0 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.49
Black 3,059.0 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.88
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Table 3.3: SARAR model of loans per capita as a dependent variable
Competition variables
Branches -0.0138*** -0.0135*** -0.0149*** -0.0150*** -0.0150*** -0.0139***
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
C3 -0.800**
-0.390
HHI -1.997*** -2.029*** -2.035*** -2.038***
-0.330 -0.331 -0.331 -0.331
Payday 0.119** 0.0848* 0.0898* 0.0900* 0.0900* 0.134***
-0.048 -0.048 -0.048 -0.048 -0.048 -0.048
Crisis variables
Crisis leverage -11.31*** -10.75*** -11.55***
-3.442 -3.426 -3.442
Capital crisis -0.441
-1.030
Tier1 crisis -0.084
-0.663
Failed banks 0.018
-0.558
Other variables
Density log 0.546*** 0.466*** 0.480*** 0.480*** 0.480*** 0.592***
-0.047 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.041
Broadband -3.626*** -4.395*** -4.532*** -4.534*** -4.536*** -3.495***
-0.918 -0.924 -0.924 -0.924 -0.925 -0.916
Income log -1.755*** -1.914*** -1.984*** -1.989*** -1.989*** -1.691***
-0.412 -0.411 -0.411 -0.411 -0.412 -0.411
Poverty -7.070*** -6.524*** -6.649*** -6.662*** -6.664*** -7.387***
-1.425 -1.417 -1.419 -1.419 -1.419 -1.417
Bachelor 2.672*** 3.291*** 3.581*** 3.598*** 3.599*** 2.830***
-1.001 -0.996 -0.993 -0.993 -0.993 -0.998
Black -0.240 0.049 0.043 0.043 0.043 -0.399
-0.461 -0.458 -0.458 -0.459 -0.459 -0.454
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Table 3.4: SARAR model of loans per capita as a dependent vari-
able (continued))
Hispanic 6.362*** 6.583*** 6.691*** 6.684*** 6.677*** 6.539***
-1.045 -1.037 -1.038 -1.038 -1.042 -1.042
Age 20 to 34 4.058 2.225 2.053 2.061 2.067 4.474
-3.133 -3.133 -3.137 -3.137 -3.142 -3.128
Constant 31.93*** 34.36*** 34.37*** 34.38*** 34.37*** 30.52***
-4.554 -4.525 -4.532 -4.532 -4.551 -4.504
Lambda 0.571*** 0.557*** 0.558*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.581***
-0.035 -0.034 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.034
Sigma2 8.078*** 7.998*** 8.023*** 8.024*** 8.024*** 8.085***
-0.207 -0.205 -0.205 -0.206 -0.206 -0.207
Number of counties 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: We estimate cross-sectional models of the geographic expansion of the P2P Credit
during the period 2006-2013. Dependent variable is the amount of P2P Credit per capital
in a county. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2. Models are estimated with maxi-
mum likelihood approach while controlling for the spatial dependence with a spatial lag term
(lambda). State dummies are not shown. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Appendix A
Additional Tables for Chapter 2
Table A.1: Matching Efficiency
Variable Group Treated Control %bias t-test p¿t
Interest rate Unmatched 0.22 0.23 -3.80 -3.06 0.00
Matched 0.22 0.22 -0.90 -0.66 0.51
Loan term Unmatched 43.35 42.96 3.00 2.41 0.02
Matched 43.35 42.92 3.30 2.65 0.01
Listing category Unmatched 4.83 5.54 -12.50 -9.98 0.00
Matched 4.83 5.05 -3.80 -3.19 0.00
# of credit inquiries Unmatched 3.95 4.08 -3.50 -2.77 0.01
Matched 3.95 4.10 -4.10 -3.33 0.00
# of traded items Unmatched 25.43 24.96 3.50 2.79 0.01
Matched 25.43 25.33 0.80 0.61 0.54
# of satisfactory accounts Unmatched 22.90 22.33 4.30 3.48 0.00
Matched 22.90 22.76 1.10 0.86 0.39
# of Delinq. Accts. Now Unmatched 0.40 0.42 -1.00 -0.81 0.42
Matched 0.40 0.39 1.30 1.10 0.27
# of Delinq. Accts. Before Unmatched 2.13 2.21 -2.40 -1.95 0.05
Matched 2.13 2.18 -1.60 -1.31 0.19
Delinquencies ¿ 30 days Unmatched 3.95 4.15 -2.70 -2.17 0.03
Matched 3.95 3.91 0.50 0.38 0.70
Delinquencies ¿ 60 days Unmatched 1.72 1.77 -1.40 -1.08 0.28
Matched 1.72 1.76 -0.90 -0.68 0.50
Delinquencies ¿ 90 days Unmatched 3.74 3.72 0.20 0.19 0.85
Matched 3.74 3.67 0.70 0.58 0.56
Install. Balance Unmatched 24865.00 23589.00 3.50 2.76 0.01
Matched 24865.00 24768.00 0.30 0.20 0.84
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Table A.2: Matching Efficiency (Continued)
Variable Group Treated Control %bias t-test p¿t
Real Estate Balance Unmatched 100,000 110,000 -2.30 -1.80 0.07
Matched 100,000 110,000 -1.00 -0.85 0.40
Revolving Balance Unmatched 18,523 17,208 3.80 3.02 0.00
Matched 18,523 18,730 -0.60 -0.45 0.65
Real Estate Pmt. Unmatched 788.82 813.19 -2.20 -1.74 0.08
Matched 788.82 796.97 -0.70 -0.60 0.55
Rev. Bal. Available Unmatched 54.37 54.62 -0.90 -0.69 0.49
Matched 54.37 54.42 -0.20 -0.16 0.88
Pub. Records 10 Yrs. Unmatched 0.25 0.27 -2.20 -1.80 0.07
Matched 0.25 0.26 -1.10 -0.92 0.36
Pub. Records 12 Yrs. Unmatched 0.01 0.01 -2.30 -1.83 0.07
Matched 0.01 0.01 -1.80 -1.50 0.14
Inquiries in 6 mos. Unmatched 1.16 1.21 -3.30 -2.62 0.01
Matched 1.16 1.20 -2.90 -2.31 0.02
Bank card trades w/ 6 Unmatched 3.94 3.73 8.20 6.53 0.00
Matched 3.94 3.88 2.30 1.81 0.07
Avail. Credit w/6 Unmatched 11991 11750 1.10 0.91 0.37
Matched 11991 11845 0.70 0.61 0.54
Bal. on bank cards w/6 Unmatched 49.23 47.73 4.70 3.75 0.00
Matched 49.23 48.30 2.90 2.36 0.02
Bal. on open trades Unmatched 19545 18484 3.60 2.85 0.00
Matched 19545 19376 0.60 0.44 0.66
# of Real Estate Trades Unmatched 1.64 1.62 0.80 0.66 0.51
Matched 1.64 1.64 -0.20 -0.15 0.88
# of propert trades Unmatched 2.18 2.20 -0.70 -0.54 0.59
Matched 2.18 2.18 -0.10 -0.05 0.96
# of Derog. Trades Unmatched 1.01 1.05 -1.70 -1.39 0.16
Matched 1.01 1.02 -0.40 -0.32 0.75
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Table A.3: Matching Efficiency (Continued)
Variable Group Treated Control %bias t-test p¿t
Monthly Debt Unmatched 856.10 820.45 4.30 3.46 0.00
Matched 856.10 853.39 0.30 0.28 0.78
# of trades Unmatched 21.94 21.51 3.60 2.87 0.00
Matched 21.94 21.86 0.70 0.56 0.58
# of open trades w/6 Unmatched 0.80 0.77 2.10 1.66 0.10
Matched 0.80 0.79 0.70 0.53 0.60
# of rep. open trades Unmatched 8.30 7.80 10.50 8.40 0.00
Matched 8.30 8.17 2.90 2.27 0.02
# of trades w/ due bal. Unmatched 0.14 0.14 -1.20 -0.95 0.34
Matched 0.14 0.13 1.10 0.95 0.34
# of open trades w/ due bal. Unmatched 0.04 0.04 -0.60 -0.51 0.61
Matched 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00
# of trades reptd. Unmatched 9.29 8.82 8.90 7.13 0.00
Matched 9.29 9.18 2.00 1.62 0.11
# of trades reptd. Derog. Unmatched 0.16 0.16 -1.30 -1.02 0.31
Matched 0.16 0.16 -0.30 -0.23 0.82
# of trades 90 ¿ derog. Unmatched 1.22 1.27 -2.30 -1.81 0.07
Matched 1.22 1.22 -0.40 -0.29 0.77
Ag. Bal. open trades Unmatched 130,000 140,000 -0.40 -0.32 0.75
Matched 130,000 140,000 -0.50 -0.43 0.67
Ag. Mon. pmt. On trades Unmatched 1548.40 1530.40 1.20 0.96 0.34
Matched 1548.40 1556.80 -0.60 -0.45 0.66
Age of oldest trade Unmatched 213.20 207.79 5.40 4.33 0.00
Matched 213.20 210.49 2.70 2.17 0.03
# of inquiries w/6 Unmatched 0.86 0.89 -2.50 -1.98 0.05
Matched 0.86 0.89 -2.50 -2.02 0.04
% of trades no. delinq. Unmatched 89.89 89.26 5.00 3.98 0.00
Matched 89.89 89.64 2.00 1.63 0.10
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Table A.4: Matching Efficiency (Continued)
Variable Group Treated Control %bias t-test p¿t
Income Range Unmatched 4.09 4.09 -0.10 -0.11 0.91
Matched 4.09 4.09 -0.30 -0.23 0.82
Debt /Income w. Prosper Unmatched 120,000 130,000 -3.80 -3.00 0.00
Matched 120,000 130,000 -2.50 -2.06 0.04
Stated Mon. Income Unmatched 6,653 6,234 1.10 0.86 0.39
Matched 6,653 7,525 -2.20 -1.00 0.32
Empl. Length Unmatched 99.42 97.45 2.00 1.61 0.11
Matched 99.42 98.28 1.20 0.94 0.35
Prior Loans Outs. Unmatched 623.12 560.25 3.20 2.52 0.01
Matched 623.12 718.68 -4.80 -3.67 0.00
Prior Bal. Outs. Unmatched 628.72 565.33 3.20 2.52 0.01
Matched 628.72 725.27 -4.80 -3.68 0.00
Prior Late loans Unmatched 0.145 0.179 -2.40 -1.90 0.06
Matched 0.145 0.183 -2.70 -2.19 0.03
Prior Late Pmts. Unmatched 0.010 0.018 -2.40 -1.91 0.06
Matched 0.010 0.009 0.20 0.23 0.82
Prior cycles 31+ Unmatched 0.003 0.006 -4.00 -3.24 0.00
Matched 0.003 0.003 -0.30 -0.32 0.75
Prior cycles 61+ Unmatched 0.001 0.002 -2.20 -1.79 0.07
Matched 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.00 1.00
Estimated Loss Rate Unmatched 0.093 0.092 1.70 1.38 0.17
Matched 0.093 0.094 -2.40 -1.84 0.07
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Appendix B
Additional Tables for Chapter 3
Table B.1: SARAR model with with number of loans per capita as
dependent variable (continued))
Black 0.346*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.351*** 0.291**
-0.119 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.119
Hispanic 0.982*** 1.044*** 1.051*** 1.052*** 1.038*** 1.020***
-0.195 -0.195 -0.195 -0.195 -0.196 -0.195
Constant 2.596** 2.644** 2.650** 2.651** 2.548** 2.102*
-1.197 -1.196 -1.197 -1.197 -1.201 -1.19
Lambda 0.960*** 0.964*** 0.965*** 0.966*** 0.964*** 0.973***
-0.0402 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.04
Sigma2 0.577*** 0.576*** 0.577*** 0.577*** 0.577*** 0.579***
-0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0149
Number of counties 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: We estimate cross-sectional models of the geographic expansion
of the P2P Credit during the period 2006-2013. Dependant variable is
the amount of P2P Credit per capital in a county. Variable definitions
are provided in Table 2. Models are estimated with maximum likelihood
approach while controlling for the spatial dependence with a spatial lag
term (lambda). State dummies are not shown. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
level, respectively.
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Table B.2: SARAR model with with number of loans per capita as dependent
variable
Competition variables
Branches -0.00301*** -0.00295*** -0.00321*** -0.00319*** -0.00314*** -0.00278***
-0.000997 -0.000995 -0.000992 -0.000992 -0.000989 -0.000996
C3 -0.346***
-0.1
HHI -0.329*** -0.337*** -0.336*** -0.341***
-0.0865 -0.0866 -0.0866 -0.0866
Payday -0.0105 -0.0123 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0107 -0.00307
-0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0129 -0.0126
Crisis variables
Crisis leverage -1.813** -1.789* -1.944**
-0.921 -0.92 -0.921
Capital crisis 0.0483
-0.276
Tier1 crisis -0.00377
-0.178
Failed banks 0.155
-0.15
Other Variables
Density 0.0557*** 0.0542*** 0.0563*** 0.0563*** 0.0559*** 0.0717***
-0.011 -0.011 -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.00996
Broadband -0.192 -0.324 -0.352 -0.352 -0.37 -0.0818
-0.32 -0.325 -0.325 -0.325 -0.325 -0.319
Income log -0.0936 -0.101 -0.114 -0.114 -0.103 -0.0835
-0.108 -0.108 -0.108 -0.108 -0.108 -0.108
Poverty -2.146*** -2.157*** -2.181*** -2.180*** -2.167*** -2.317***
-0.384 -0.383 -0.383 -0.383 -0.383 -0.381
Bachelor 1.486*** 1.620*** 1.674*** 1.672*** 1.661*** 1.595***
-0.257 -0.255 -0.254 -0.253 -0.254 -0.255
Age 20 to 34 -0.174 -0.348 -0.389 -0.389 -0.343 0.0615
-0.778 -0.782 -0.782 -0.782 -0.784 -0.776
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Table B.3: SARAR model with volume of loans per capita as dependent
variable
Innovation variables
Patents log 0.118**
-0.0566
Broadband -4.395***
-0.924
Optical fiber -0.348
-0.255
Mobile -1.278***
-0.348
Speed10000k -0.0316
-0.168
Speed50000k 0.0367
-0.169
Other variables
Branches -0.0121*** -0.0135*** -0.0126*** -0.0135*** -0.0131*** -0.0132***
-0.00382 -0.00382 -0.00385 -0.00382 -0.00385 -0.00384
HHI -1.630*** -1.997*** -1.738*** -1.978*** -1.744*** -1.744***
-0.327 -0.33 -0.327 -0.333 -0.327 -0.327
Payday 0.0668 0.0848* 0.0685 0.0837* 0.0702 0.0689
-0.0482 -0.048 -0.048 -0.0481 -0.0481 -0.0481
Crisis levergae -12.19*** -10.75*** -11.34*** -11.70*** -11.55*** -11.49***
-3.431 -3.426 -3.437 -3.428 -3.436 -3.441
Density 0.449*** 0.466*** 0.446*** 0.465*** 0.449*** 0.444***
-0.0476 -0.0461 -0.0461 -0.0462 -0.0468 -0.0488
Income log -1.460*** -1.914*** -1.899*** -1.955*** -1.962*** -1.964***
-0.371 -0.411 -0.415 -0.411 -0.412 -0.412
Poverty -5.722*** -6.524*** -5.865*** -6.481*** -5.882*** -5.852***
-1.431 -1.417 -1.415 -1.422 -1.417 -1.417
Bachelor 3.291*** 3.454*** 3.313*** 3.439*** 3.392***
-0.996 -0.999 -0.997 -1.007 -1.004
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Table B.4: SARAR model with volume of loans per capita as de-
pendent variable (continued)
Age 20 to 34 4.916* 2.225 2.075 2.552 1.944 1.927
-2.981 -3.133 -3.145 -3.142 -3.145 -3.148
Black -0.0367 0.0493 -0.107 0.0653 -0.115 -0.135
-0.463 -0.458 -0.458 -0.46 -0.462 -0.46
Hispanic 6.690*** 6.583*** 6.419*** 6.668*** 6.451*** 6.424***
-1.04 -1.037 -1.04 -1.04 -1.045 -1.041
Constant 25.08*** 34.36*** 29.82*** 31.71*** 30.50*** 30.51***
-4.048 -4.525 -4.494 -4.471 -4.468 -4.468
Lambda 0.550*** 0.557*** 0.549*** 0.548*** 0.551*** 0.550***
-0.0346 -0.0344 -0.0346 -0.0345 -0.0345 -0.0345
Sigma2 8.079*** 7.998*** 8.055*** 8.025*** 8.059*** 8.059***
-0.207 -0.205 -0.206 -0.206 -0.206 -0.206
Number of counties 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: We estimate cross-sectional models of the geographic expansion
of the P2P Credit during the period 2006-2013. Variable definitions are
provided in Table 2. Models are estimated with maximum likelihood
approach while controlling for the spatial dependence with a spatial lag
term (lambda). State dummies are not shown. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
level, respectively.
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Table B.5: SARAR model with with number of loans per capita as dependent
variable
Innovation variables
Patents log 0.0252*
-0.0149
Broadband -0.324
-0.325
Optical fiber -0.109
-0.0663
Mobile -0.0313
-0.148
Speed10000k -0.0412
-0.0515
Speed50000k 0.0239
-0.0517
Other variables
Branches -0.00229** -0.00295*** -0.00277*** -0.00295*** -0.00286*** -0.00298***
-0.000996 -0.000995 -0.001 -0.000995 -0.001 -0.000999
HHI -0.280*** -0.329*** -0.310*** -0.316*** -0.315*** -0.307***
-0.0856 -0.0865 -0.0848 -0.0871 -0.085 -0.0854
Payday -0.0161 -0.0123 -0.0137 -0.0129 -0.0136 -0.0133
-0.0129 -0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0129 -0.0128 -0.0128
Crisis leverage -2.348** -1.789* -1.782* -1.828** -1.872** -1.786*
-0.922 -0.92 -0.92 -0.919 -0.921 -0.924
Density 0.0620*** 0.0542*** 0.0533*** 0.0537*** 0.0551*** 0.0516***
-0.0113 -0.011 -0.0109 -0.011 -0.0111 -0.0117
Income log 0.178* -0.101 -0.0844 -0.105 -0.104 -0.106
-0.0984 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.108 -0.108
Poverty -2.119*** -2.157*** -2.098*** -2.119*** -2.132*** -2.091***
-0.385 -0.383 -0.379 -0.384 -0.38 -0.38
Bachelor 1.620*** 1.651*** 1.629*** 1.664*** 1.615***
-0.255 -0.255 -0.255 -0.257 -0.257
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Table B.6: SARAR model with with number of loans per capita as
dependent variable (continued)
Age 20 to 34 0.685 -0.348 -0.355 -0.381 -0.419 -0.405
-0.766 -0.782 -0.781 -0.784 -0.781 -0.781
Black 0.363*** 0.355*** 0.335*** 0.344*** 0.353*** 0.334***
-0.12 -0.12 -0.119 -0.12 -0.12 -0.119
Hispanic 1.116*** 1.044*** 1.017*** 1.032*** 1.044*** 1.027***
-0.195 -0.195 -0.194 -0.196 -0.195 -0.194
Constant -0.531 2.644** 2.145* 2.391** 2.374** 2.360**
-1.072 -1.196 -1.172 -1.169 -1.164 -1.164
Lambda 0.977*** 0.964*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.964*** 0.962***
-0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0401
Sigma2 0.583*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.577*** 0.577*** 0.577***
-0.015 -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0149
Number of counties 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: We estimate cross-sectional models of the geographic expansion
of the P2P Credit during the period 2006-2013. Variable definitions are
provided in Table 2. Models are estimated with maximum likelihood
approach while controlling for the spatial dependence with a spatial lag
term (lambda). State dummies are not shown. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
level, respectively.
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Table B.7: SARAR model for the expansion of Prosper and Lending
Club
Vol. of loans per capita of loans per capita
Lending Club Prosper Lending Club Prosper
Branches -0.0177*** -0.00816* -0.00325*** -0.00118
-0.00406 -0.00471 -0.00105 -0.000865
HHI -1.157*** -4.339*** -0.284*** -0.0352
-0.349 -0.407 -0.0915 -0.0751
Payday -0.0796 0.273*** -0.0281** -0.0124
-0.051 -0.0591 -0.0136 -0.0112
Crisis leverage -5.11 -24.37*** -0.657 -1.546*
-3.643 -4.228 -0.974 -0.8
Density 0.540*** 0.637*** 0.019 0.0443***
-0.0494 -0.0574 -0.0116 -0.00952
Broadband -6.414*** 3.009*** -0.546 0.382
-0.981 -1.139 -0.344 -0.283
Income log -0.601 -2.197*** -0.0349 -0.230**
-0.435 -0.507 -0.114 -0.0934
Poverty -3.414** -8.524*** -2.068*** -1.978***
-1.504 -1.756 -0.404 -0.333
Bachelor 2.473** 4.979*** 0.995*** 1.709***
-1.058 -1.227 -0.269 -0.222
Age 20 to 34 -3.879 14.23*** -0.227 -1.290*
-3.332 -3.864 -0.828 -0.68
Black -0.447 -0.0792 0.440*** 0.408***
-0.487 -0.566 -0.127 -0.104
Hispanic 6.677*** 2.032 0.912*** 0.627***
-1.106 -1.275 -0.207 -0.169
Constant 19.80*** 28.79*** 1.825 2.829***
-4.797 -5.587 -1.259 -1.034
Lambda 1.169*** 0.378*** 1.033*** 0.679***
-0.0293 -0.0446 -0.0436 -0.0525
Sigma2 9.045*** 12.16*** 0.646*** 0.436***
-0.233 -0.311 -0.0167 -0.0112
Number of counties 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
We estimate cross-sectional models of the geographic expansion of the P2P
Credit during the period 2006-2013. Variable definitions are provided in
Table 2. Models are estimated with maximum likelihood approach while
controlling for the spatial dependence with a spatial lag term (lambda). State
dummies are not shown. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table B.8: SARAR model for the expansion of P2P Credit year by year
Branches -0.00557 0.0049 0.00236 -0.0038 -0.0109** -0.0111** -0.0166***
-0.00448 -0.00457 -0.00391 -0.00451 -0.00489 -0.0048 -0.00422
HHI -1.426*** -1.981*** -0.718** -2.186*** -2.923*** -3.413*** -2.180***
-0.388 -0.396 -0.34 -0.39 -0.421 -0.415 -0.365
Payday 0.0639 0.0706 -0.00717 0.0668 0.148** 0.109* 0.0899*
-0.0532 -0.0559 -0.0491 -0.0571 -0.062 -0.0568 -0.0512
Crisis leverage -18.14*** -15.27*** -8.714** -13.22*** -14.52*** -11.41*** -2.877
-4.052 -4.129 -3.546 -4.075 -4.421 -4.339 -3.826
density log 0.561*** 0.728*** 0.678*** 0.767*** 0.787*** 0.531*** 0.530***
-0.0541 -0.056 -0.0481 -0.0558 -0.0611 -0.0591 -0.0523
Broadband 1.281 1.997* -1.088 -0.882 -0.73 -3.385*** -5.488***
-1.093 -1.11 -0.955 -1.096 -1.187 -1.169 -1.03
income log -0.123 -1.301*** 0.3 0.388 -1.075** -1.762*** -1.447***
-0.534 -0.496 -0.459 -0.496 -0.471 -0.442 -0.384
Poverty -2.52 -7.419*** -1.526 -3.929** -5.620*** -6.741*** -6.658***
-1.699 -1.724 -1.475 -1.678 -1.795 -1.741 -1.542
Bachelor 9.016*** 9.365*** 9.182*** 6.777*** 6.128*** 5.310*** 1.803*
-1.245 -1.218 -1.046 -1.176 -1.248 -1.228 -1.063
Black -0.743 -0.726 0.275 -0.940* -0.581 0.347 0.00288
-0.548 -0.553 -0.476 -0.542 -0.586 -0.574 -0.505
Hispanic 6.900*** 4.552*** 6.814*** 6.204*** 5.107*** 7.809*** 7.375***
-1.253 -1.249 -1.082 -1.236 -1.331 -1.314 -1.157
Age 20 to 34 8.764** 10.72*** 2.962 10.15*** 7.376* 5.554 -0.575
-3.757 -3.78 -3.252 -3.708 -4.008 -3.95 -3.466
Constant 2.268 15.47*** -0.129 0.468 18.02*** 28.71*** 28.68***
-5.853 -5.46 -5.056 -5.458 -5.228 -4.941 -4.266
Lambda 0.742*** 0.377*** 0.568*** 0.565*** 0.616*** 0.754*** 0.915***
-0.0481 -0.0521 -0.0502 -0.0481 -0.0465 -0.0411 -0.0339
Sigma2 11.21*** 11.57*** 8.556*** 11.29*** 13.24*** 12.82*** 9.934***
-0.288 -0.296 -0.22 -0.29 -0.34 -0.329 -0.255
No. of Obs. 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059
Notes: We estimate cross-sectional models of the geographic expansion of the P2P
Credit during the period 2007-2013 for each year. Variable definitions are provided
in Table 2. Models are estimated with maximum likelihood approach while control-
ling for the spatial dependence with a spatial lag term (lambda). State dummies
are not shown. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table B.9: OLS regressions
VARIABLES Total Volume Total No. of Loans
Branches -0.0110*** -0.00211*
-0.004 -0.0011
HHI -2.632*** -0.465***
-0.344 -0.0955
Payday 0.113** -0.016
-0.0503 -0.0142
Crisis leverage -10.80*** -2.304**
-3.594 -1.017
Density 0.499*** 0.0700***
-0.0483 -0.0121
Broadband -3.843*** -0.0923
-0.968 -0.359
income log -3.083*** -0.445***
-0.424 -0.118
Poverty -8.178*** -3.124***
-1.483 -0.421
Bachelor 3.899*** 2.142***
-1.044 -0.281
Black 0.228 0.512***
-0.48 -0.132
Hispanic 7.831*** 1.703***
-1.084 -0.214
Age 20 to 34 2.981 -0.42
-3.286 -0.865
Constant 48.71*** 6.739***
-4.655 -1.309
Observations 3,059 3,059
R-squared 0.192 0.15
125
Table B.10: Marginal Effects
Volume of P2P loans Number of P2P loans
ATDI ATII ATI ATDI ATII ATI
Branches -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0016 -0.0038
HHI -0.1963 -0.0628 -0.2591 -14,631 -0.468 -19,312
Broadband -0.4321 -0.1382 -0.5703 -32,202 -10,300 -42,502
Poverty -0.6414 -0.2052 -0.8466 -47,799 -15,290 -63,089
Hispanic 0.6472 0.207 0.8542 48,232 15,428 63,660
Income log -0.1882 -0.0602 -0.2484 -14,023 -0.4486 -18,509
Payday 0.0083 0.0027 0.011 0.0621 0.0199 0.082
Education 0.3235 0.1035 0.427 24,111 0.7712 31,823
Black 0.0048 0.0016 0.0064 0.0361 0.0116 0.0477
Age 0.2187 0.07 0.2887 16,300 0.5214 21,514
Crisis leverage -10,565 -0.3379 -13,944 -78,735 -25,185 -103,921
Density 0.0458 0.0147 0.0605 0.3417 0.1093 0.4509
Table B.11: Marginal Effects (Continued)
Lending Club Volume Prosper Volume
ATDI ATII ATI ATDI ATII ATI
Branches -0.002 -0.0021 -0.0041 -0.0011 -0.0002 0.00
HHI -0.1318 -0.1352 -0.267 -0.5643 -0.1117 -0.676
Broadband -0.7305 -0.7494 -14,799 0.3914 0.0775 0.4688
Poverty -0.3888 -0.3988 -0.7876 -11,087 -0.2195 -13,282
Hispanic 0.7605 0.7801 15,405 0.2643 0.0523 0.3166
Income log -0.0684 -0.0702 -0.1386 -0.2857 -0.0566 -0.3423
Payday -0.0091 -0.0093 -0.0184 0.0355 0.007 0.0426
Education 0.2817 0.289 0.5707 0.6477 0.1282 0.7759
Black -0.0509 -0.0522 -0.1031 -0.0103 -0.002 -0.0123
Age -0.4418 -0.4532 -0.895 18,512 0.3665 22,176
Crisis leverage -0.582 -0.597 -11,790 -31,695 -0.6275 -37,970
Density 0.0615 0.0631 0.1246 0.0829 0.0164 0.0993
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Table B.12: Marginal Effects (Continued)
Lending Club Number Prosper Number
ATDI ATII ATI ATDI ATII ATI
Branches -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.0063 -0.0026 -0.0011 -0.0036
HHI -0.3026 -0.2445 -0.5471 -0.0767 -0.032 -0.1088
Broadband -0.5816 -0.47 -10,516 0.833 0.3479 11,809
Poverty -22,045 -17,814 -39,859 -43,074 -17,989 -61,064
Hispanic 0.9721 0.7855 17,576 13,654 0.5702 19,356
Income log -0.0372 -0.03 -0.0672 -0.5017 -0.2095 -0.7113
Payday -0.0299 -0.0242 -0.0541 -0.027 -0.0113 -0.0383
Education 10,607 0.8571 19,178 37,217 15,543 52,760
Black 0.4693 0.3793 0.8486 0.8891 0.3713 12,604
Age -0.2423 -0.1958 -0.4382 -28,091 -11,732 -39,822
Crisis leverage -0.7002 -0.5658 -12,660 -33,679 -14,066 -47,745
Density 0.0203 0.0164 0.0367 0.0966 0.0403 0.1369
Bibliography
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for ”lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3):488–500.
Anselin, L. et al. (1980). Estimation methods for spatial autoregressive structures.
Estimation methods for spatial autoregressive structures., (8).
Aubuchon, C. P., Wheelock, D. C., et al. (2010). The geographic distribution and
characteristics of us bank failures, 2007-2010: do bank failures still reflect local
economic conditions? Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 92(5):395–415.
Bass, F. M. (1969). A new product growth for model consumer durables. Manage-
ment science, 15(5):215–227.
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., and Peria, M. S. M. (2007). Reaching out: Access
to and use of banking services across countries. Journal of Financial Economics,
85(1):234–266.
Berger, A. N., Demsetz, R. S., and Strahan, P. E. (1999). The consolidation of the
financial services industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 23(2):135–194.
Black, S. E. and Strahan, P. E. (2002). Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability.
The Journal of Finance, 57(6):2807–2833.
Blundell-Wignall, A. and Roulet, C. (2013). Business models of banks, leverage and
the distance-to-default. OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2012(2):7–34.
Butler, A. W., Cornaggia, J., and Gurun, U. G. (2016). Do local capital market
conditions affect consumers[U+FFFD]rrowing decisions? Management Science.
Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., and Saez, E. (2013). Using differences in knowledge
across neighborhoods to uncover the impacts of the eitc on earnings. American
Economic Review, 103(7):2683–2721.
Claessens, S. and Laeven, L. (2004). What drives bank competition? some interna-
tional evidence. Journal of Money, credit, and Banking, 36(3):563–583.
Comin, D. A., Dmitriev, M., and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2012). The spatial diffusion
of technology. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cox, N. (2017). Pricing, selection, and welfare in the student loan market: Evidence
from borrower repayment decisions. Manuscript, University of California, Berkeley.
128
Crawford, G., N. P. and Schivardi, F. (2016). Asymmetric information and imperfect
competition in lending markets. Working Paper, University of Zurich.
DeYoung, R., Lang, W. W., and Nolle, D. L. (2007). How the internet affects output
and performance at community banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(4):1033–
1060.
Dick, A. A. (2007). Market size, service quality, and competition in banking. Journal
of money, credit and banking, 39(1):49–81.
Drukker, D. M., Peng, H., Prucha, I. R., Raciborski, R., et al. (2013). Creating and
managing spatial-weighting matrices with the spmat command. Stata Journal,
13(2):242–286.
Duarte, J., Siegel, S., and Young, L. (2012). Trust and credit: the role of appearance
in peer-to-peer lending. The Review of Financial Studies, 25(8):2455–2484.
Edelberg, W. (2006). Risk-based pricing of interest rates for consumer loans. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 53(8):2283–2298.
Einav, L., Jenkins, M., and Levin, J. (2012). Contract pricing in consumer credit
markets. Econometrica, 80(4):1387–1432.
Einav, L., Jenkins, M., and Levin, J. (2013a). The impact of credit scoring on
consumer lending. The RAND Journal of Economics, 44(2):249–274.
Einav, L., Jenkins, M., and Levin, J. (2013b). The impact of credit scoring on
consumer lending. RAND Journal of Economics, 44(2):249–274.
Fitch (2014). Peer to peer lending,. Global Industry Overview. Fitch Ratings Report.
Fradkin, A. (2014). Auctions versus posted prices in online markets. NBER Working
Paper.
Frame, W. S. and White, L. J. (2014). Technological change, financial innovation,
and diffusion in banking.
Freedman, S. and Jin, G. Z. (2008). Do social networks solve information problems
for peer-to-peer lending? evidence from prosper. com.
Gao, Q. and Lin, M. (2013). Linguistic features and peer-to-peer loan quality: A
machine learning approach. Available at SSRN.
Geroski, P. A. (1989). Entry, innovation and productivity growth. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, pages 572–578.
129
Grodzicki, D. (2012). The evolution of competition in the credit card industry.
Manuscript, Stanford University.
Hagiu, A. and Wright, J. (2015a). Marketplace or reseller? Management Science,
61(1):184–203.
Hagiu, A. and Wright, J. (2015b). Multi-sided platforms. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 43(C):162–174.
Haldane, A. (2012). The dog and the frisbee, speech given at the federal reserve
bank of kansas city[U+FFFD]6th economic policy symposium [U+FFFD]e changing
policy landscape[U+FFFD]Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
Haldane, A. G. (2011). Capital discipline based on a speech given at the american
economic association.
Hannan, T. H. and Prager, R. A. (1998). The relaxation of entry barriers in the bank-
ing industry: An empirical investigation. Journal of Financial Services Research,
14(3):171–188.
Hasan, I., Koetter, M., and Wedow, M. (2009). Regional growth and finance in
europe: Is there a quality effect of bank efficiency? Journal of Banking & Finance,
33(8):1446–1453.
Hastie, T., Tibshirani, R., and Friedman, J. (2009). The elements of statistical
learning: data mining, inference and prediction. Springer, 2 edition.
Hernando, I. and Nieto, M. J. (2007). Is the internet delivery channel changing
banks[U+FFFD]rformance? the case of spanish banks. Journal of Banking & Fi-
nance, 31(4):1083–1099.
Herzenstein, M., Sonenshein, S., and Dholakia, U. M. (2011). Tell me a good story
and i may lend you money: the role of narratives in peer-to-peer lending decisions.
Journal of Marketing Research, 48(SPL):S138–S149.
Iyer, R., Khwaja, A. I., Luttmer, E. F. P., and Shue, K. (2016). Screening peers
softly: Inferring the quality of small borrowers. Management Science, 62(6):1554–
1577.
Karlan, D. and Zinman, J. (2005). Observing unobservables: identifying information
asymmetries with a consumer-credit field experiment. Proceedings 961, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Kim, M., Kliger, D., and Vale, B. (2003). Estimating switching costs: the case of
banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12(1):25–56.
130
LeSage, J. P. (2008). An introduction to spatial econometrics. Revue d’e´conomie
industrielle, (3):19–44.
LeSage, J. P. and Pace, R. K. (2009). Introduction to Spatial Econometrics (Statis-
tics, textbooks and monographs). CRC Press.
Mariathasan, M. and Merrouche, O. (2014). The manipulation of basel risk-weights.
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 23(3):300–321.
Meyer, A. (2013). Pricing mechanisms in peer-to-peer online credit markets.
Manuscript, Stanford University.
Mitra, T. and Gilbert, E. (2014). The language that gets people to give: Phrases
that predict success on kickstarter. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on
Computer supported cooperative work & social computing, pages 49–61. ACM.
Morse, A. (2015). Peer-to-peer crowdfunding: Information and the potential for
disruption in consumer lending. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 7:463–
482.
Philippon, T. (2015). Has the us finance industry become less efficient? on the
theory and measurement of financial intermediation. The American Economic
Review, 105(4):1408–1438.
Pope, D. G. and Sydnor, J. R. (2011). What?s in a picture?: Evidence of discrimi-
nation from prosper.com. Journal of Human Resources, 46(1):53–92.
Rahim, T. (2017). Can peer-to-peer online platforms improve market outcomes by
controlling prices? Manuscript, Boston University.
Ravina, E. (2013). Love and loans: The effect of beauty and personal characteristics
in credit markets. Working paper, Columbia Business School.
Rey, S. J. and Montouri, B. D. (1999). Us regional income convergence: a spatial
econometric perspective. Regional studies, 33(2):143–156.
Rhoades, S. A. et al. (2000). Bank mergers and banking structure in the united states,
1980-98. Technical report, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of innovations. free press. New York, page 551.
Rysman, M. (2009). The economics of two-sided markets. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 23(3):125–143.
Shy, O. (2002). A quick-and-easy method for estimating switching costs. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(1):71–87.
131
Wei, Z. and Lin, M. (2016). Market mechanisms in online peer-to-peer lending.
Management Science, 0(0):null.
Zhang, J. and Liu, P. (2012). Rational herding in microloan markets. Management
Science, 58(5):892–912.
132
CURRICULUM VITAE
Talal Rahim
EDUCATION
Ph.D. in Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, 2018 (expected)
Dissertation Title: Essays in Industrial Organization of Credit Markets
Dissertation Committee: Marc Rysman, Berardino Palazzo, Hiroaki Kaido
M.Sc., Economics,
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom,
2011
M.Sc., Economics and Finance,
Lahore School of Economics, Lahore, Pakistan, 2009
FIELDS OF INTEREST
Industrial Organization, Financial Economics, Applied Econometrics, Computa-
tional Economics
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Department Fellowship, Boston University Economics Department, 2012 - 2017
Initiative of Cities Fellowship, Boston University, 2015
Co-Recipient of First Prize, Smart City Track, Thingworx Internet of Things
Hackathon, 2015
Co-Recipient of Runner Up Prize, Wearables Track, MIT Medicine Grand Hackathon,
2015
University Merit Scholarship, Lahore School of Economics, 2005 - 2009
WORK EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant, Boston University, Boston, MA, 09/2016 - 05/2017
Data Science Fellow, Office of Mayor, City of Providence, Summer 2015
133
WORKING PAPERS
“Can Peer-to-Peer Platforms Improve Market Outcomes by Controlling Prices?”
(Job Market Paper), July 2017
“Impact of Finer Credit Scoring on Borrower Loan Outcomes”, July 2018
“What Drives the Expansion of Peer-to-Peer Lending?”, May 2018
“Determinants of Bank Branching Decisions in an Emerging Market” December
2016
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Fellow, Financial Economics (Master’s level), Boston University
Teaching Fellow, Public Control of Business (Master’s level), Boston University
Teaching Fellow, Environmental Economics (Master’s. level), Boston University
Teaching Fellow, Topics in Macro and Monetary Theory (Master’s. level), Boston
University
Introduction to Macroeconomics, Boston University
CONFERENCES AND EXTERNAL PRESENTATIONS
Industrial Organization Society, 15th Annual Conference, April 2017
George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Digital Information Policy
Scholars Conference, April 2017
Empirical Microeconomics Seminar, Boston University, April 2015, May 2016,
October 2016
Computer Skills: R, Matlab, Stata, Python, Ampl and LATEX
Languages: English (native), Urdu/Hindi (native)
Citizenship/Visa: Pakistan / F-1
